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Abstract:   In   this   paper   I   will   try   to   outline   the   basic   tenets   of   Radical  
Minimalism,  exploring  previous  ideas  in  further  depth  (Krivochen,  2010a,  b,  
c,  d,  2011).   I  will  assume  orthodox  Minimalism,  and  take  that  as  a  point  of  
departure   for   new   inquiries.   I   will   test   Radical   Minimalism   by   analyzing  
what  I  consider  to  be  the  one  and  only  generative  mechanism  in  the  human  
mind:   the   operation   merge.   I   will   review   previous   literature   that   has  
addressed  this  topic  and  then  present  our  own  proposal,  trying  to  derive  the  
conceptual   necessity   and   the   properties   of  merge   and   label   from   interface  
conditions.   I  will   also   address   the   question   of   feature   interpretability,   and  
see  if  I  can  dispense  with  that  in  order  to  build  a  radically  minimalist  theory.  
I  will   also  present  our   theory  of  derivation  by  phases   in   radically  minimalist  
terms,  which  will  implicate  positing  only  principled  operations  and  deriving  
everything  from  the  dynamics  of  the  derivation  in  interaction  with  interface  
requirements.  My   ultimate   goal  will   be   to   integrate   the   study   of   language  
and   the   study   of   the   physical   universe,   as   a   physical   system   among   many  
others   with   which   language   should   optimally   share   characteristics,  
operations  and  principles  that  I  take  to  be  universal.    
Keywords:  Radical   Minimalism,   Merge,   Transfer,   phases,   labels,   quantum  
mechanics,  features,  licensing,  interface  conditions.    
Resumen:   En   este   artículo   trataré   de   esbozar   los   principios   básicos   del  
Minimalismo  Radical  profundizando  en   la   línea  de   lo  que  ya  he  propuesto  
en   artículos   anteriores   (Krivochen   2010a,   b,   c,   d,   2011).   Asumiré   el  
Minimalismo   ortodoxo   y   lo   tomaré   como   punto   de   partida   para   nuevas  
preguntas.      Pondré   a   prueba   el   Minimalismo   Radical   analizando   lo   que  
considero   que   es   el   único   mecanismo   generativo   en   la   mente   humana:   la  
operación  fusión.  Revisaré  algunos  de  los  trabajos  realizados  sobre  este  tema  
y   presentaré   mi   propia   propuesta   tratando   de   derivar   las   necesidades  
conceptuales  y  las  propiedades  de  merge  y  etiqueta  desde  las  condiciones  de  
los   interfaces.   También   trataré   la   cuestión   de   la   interpretabilidad   de   los  
rasgos   y   veré   si   puedo   prescindir   de   esto   para   construir   una   teoría  
minimalista   radical.   También   presentaré  mi   teoría   sobre   la   derivación   por  
                                                                                                 
1  I   would   like   to   thank   Peter   Kosta,   Manuel   Leonetti,   Hedde   Zeijlstra,   Anna  
Maria   Di   Sciullo,   Mike   Putnam   and   Phoevos   Panagiotidis   for   their   comments   and  
support  in  the  development  of  this  approach.  Their  suggestions  have  helped  greatly  to  
make  this  a  better  work  All  remaining  mistakes,  needless  to  say,  are  entirely  my  fault.  
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fases   en   términos   de   minimalismo   radical.   Esto   implicará   proponer   solo  
operaciones  controladas  por  principios  y  derivar  todo  desde  a  dinámica  de  
la  derivación  en  interacción  con  los  requisitos  de  interfaz.  Mi  último  objetivo  
será   integrar   el   estudio  del   lenguaje   en   el   estudio  del   universo  de   la   física  
como   un   sistema   físico   entre   otros   muchos   con   los   que   el   lenguaje   podría  
óptimamente  compartir  características,  operaciones  y  principios  que  asumo  
universales.  
Palabras   clave:   Minimalismo   Radical,   Fusión,   Transferencia,   fases,  
etiquetas,  mecánica  cuántica,  rasgos,  licencia,  condiciones  de  interfaz.    
Resumo:   Neste   artigo   tentarei   delinear   os   princípios   básicos   do  
Minimalismo   Radical,   aprofundando   na   linha   daquilo   que   foi   dito   em  
artigos  anteriores  (Krivochen,  2010a,  b,  c,  d,  2011).  Assumirei  o  Minimalismo  
ortodoxo,   e   tomá-­‐‑lo-­‐‑ei   como   ponto   de   partida   para   novas   interrogações.  
Testarei  o  Minimalismo  Radical  analisando  aquele  que  considero  ser  o  único  
mecanismo  generativo  na  mente  humana:  a  operação  compor.  Farei  a  revisão  
de  alguns  trabalhos  realizados  sobre  o  assunto  e  apresentarei  em  seguida  a  
nossa   própria   proposta,   tentando   derivar   a   necessidade   conceitual   e   as  
propriedades   de   compor   e   etiquetar   de   condições   de   interface.   Abordarei  
também   a   questão   da   interpretabilidade   de   traços,   e   verei   se   dela   posso  
prescindir   de   modo   a   construir   uma   teoria   radicalmente   minimalista.  
Apresentarei   também   a   nossa   teoria   de   derivação   por   fases   em   termos  
radicalmente   minimalistas,   o   que   implicará   assumir   apenas   operações  
regidas  por  princípios  e  derivar  tudo  da  dinâmica  da  derivação  em  interação  
com  os  requisitos  de  interface.  O  meu  objectivo  final  será  integrar  o  estudo  
da  linguagem  no  estudo  do  universo  físico  enquanto  um  sistema  físico  entre  
muitos   outros   com   os   quais   a   linguagem   deverá   otimamente   partilhar  
caraterísticas,  operações  e  princípios  que  considero  serem  universais.      
Palavras-­‐‑chave:   Minimalismo   Radical,   Compor,   Transferência,   fases,  
etiquetas,  mecânica  quântica,  traços,  licenciamento,  condições  de  interface.    
1.  Merge  
According   to   Chomsky   (2007:   3,   5),   “In   its   most   elementary   form,   a  
generative   system   is   based   on   an   operation   that   takes   structures   already   formed   and  
combines  them  into  a  new  structure.  Call  it  Merge.  (…)  Suppose  X  and  Y  are  merged.  
Evidently,   efficient   computation   will   leave   X   and   Y   unchanged   (the   No-­‐‑Tampering  
Condition   NTC).”   Merge   is   restricted   to   two   elements   for   theoretical   and  
empirical  reasons:  two  is  the  smallest  non-­‐‑trivial  union  of  elements,  which  is  the  
optimal   option   in   a   minimalist   framework.   Besides,   positing   strictly   binary  
Merge   is   supported,   among   other   arguments,   by   Kayne’s   unambiguous   paths  
(which  can  be  seen  as  a  condition  on  phrase  markers  formation)  and  semantic  
interpretation  (related  to  the  problem  of   labeling,  which  I  will  analyze  deeply).  
Any   generative   theory   is,   then,   in   essence,   a   theory   about   Merge   and   its  
motivations   and   consequences.   The   type   of   system   that   Chomsky   describes  
generates  structures  like  the  following:  
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(1)  
       
Note   that   Chomsky’s   remark   is   neutral   with   respect   to   the   mental  
domain   in  which   the   operation   applies,   so   that   it   is   on  us   to   restrict   it   to   the  
Faculty  of  Language  (FL  from  now  on)  or  take  the  stronger  view  that  merge   is  
the  one  and  only  combinatory  mechanism  in  the  human  mind,  regardless  of  the  
module.  As   I  have  argued  elsewhere   (Krivochen,  2010b,  d),   I   take   the   second,  
strong  position.  Any  module  that  deals  with  structured  discrete  symbols  must  
apply  merge  in  order  to  combine  them2,  be  them  semantic  primitives  (see  Mateu  
Fontanals,  2000a,  b),  sounds  (Jackendoff  and  Lerdahl,  2004,  Katz  and  Pesetsky,  
2011)  or  lexical  items,  to  give  just  a  few  examples.  Merge  is  the  minimalist  name  
for   Humboldt’s   remark   that   language   is   a   system   of   discrete   infinitude,   to  
which   I   will   add   “but   not   the   only   one”.   The   nature   of   α   and   β   in   my  
representation,   can   therefore   vary   depending   on   the   vertical   faculty   we   are  
dealing  with.  The  only  thing  one  can  say  for  sure  is  that  this  operation  belongs  
to  Chomsky’s  (2005b)   first  factor,  genetic  endowment,  that  is,   it   is  not  acquired  
but  given.  Merge  is  an  operation  that  “comes  free”,  which  I  will  take  in  the  sense  
that   (a)   it   is   computationally   costless   and   (b)   it   cannot   be   reduced   or  
decomposed.  I  will  analyze  this  second  point  deeper  in  the  following  sections,  
when   I   review   four   of   the  most   influential   conceptions   about  Merge   that   are  
circulating  nowadays,  some  of  which  try  to  decompose  merge  in  more  primitive  
operations.  
1.1.  Chomsky  (1998,  2004,  2005a,  2007)  
Given  a  generative  system  as  characterized  above,  one  needs  something  to  
combine,  and  this  something  will  be,  for  the  time  being,  lexical  items.  However,  
this   is   not   it,   according   to   Chomsky.  We   also   need   a   certain   property   in   the  
units   that   allows   them   to  be   combined,   say,   a   feature   conveying   the   syntactic  
instruction  “I  am  mergeable”.  This  property  is  called  an  Edge  Feature  (Chomsky,  
2005a),  and  is  present  in  every  lexical  item,  excluding  vocatives  and  interjections.  
Proposing   this   property   (it   is   not   a   feature,   really,   since   it   is   not   a   “valuable  
dimension”,   in   Uriagereka’s   terms)   amounts   to   trying   to   justify   Merge  
                                                                                                 
2  The   continuous   application   of  Merge   is   called   “monotonic  Merge”.  Merge’s  
asymmetry   comes   from   its   intrinsically   diachronic   character   (Epstein,   1999),   contra  
Chomsky  (1995),  to  whom  its  asymmetry  was  given  by  headedness.  We  will  argue  that,  
in   consonance   with   Chomsky   (2009),   headedness   is   an   epiphenomenon,   interface-­‐‑
motivated.    
α   β  
γ  
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syntactically,  that  is,  Merge  is  a  feature  motivated  operation,   like  anything  else  in  
C(HL).  Of  course,  in  a  strict  sense,  if  we  take  this  view,  Merge  does  not  “come  free”  
at  all,  contrarily  to  Chomsky’s  claims,  since  we  have  to  introduce  a  new  element  
in  the  model,  with  the  only  purpose  of  justifying  an  operation.  This  position  of  
motivating  Merge  has  been  also  defended  by  Pesetsky  and  Torrego,  who  claim  
that  there  must  be  some  kind  of  feature  checking  taking  place,  as  all  operations  
should   optimally   be   feature-­‐‑driven.   The   role   of   the   EF   is   not   clear   nowadays,  
because   it   has   been   posited   that   this   property,   that   allows   Merge   at   the  
periphery  (in  consonance  with  the  Extension  Condition)  in  all  LI,   is  present  in  
phase   heads   as   a   non-­‐‑erasable   element   (despite   being   uninterpretable),   thus  
allowing  multiple   Spec-­‐‑   positions   that   act   as   escape   hatches   and   intermediate  
landing  sites  for  successive-­‐‑cyclic  movement.  The  EF  also  overlaps  with  the  old  
EPP  feature  especially  in  a  feature  inheritance  (or  sharing,  as  Gallego  2010  prefers  
to   say)   framework.   Apparently,   phase   heads   bear   an   EF,   which   can   act   as   a  
double  probe:  in  the  case  of  C,  for  example,  its  EF,  together  with  its  Wh-­‐‑  feature,  
attract  a  Wh-­‐‑  marked  constituent  to  the  periphery  of  C,  while  it  also  attracts  the  
EA  to  the  Spec-­‐‑TP  position.  Bong-­‐‑Kim  (2010)  has  suggested  that,  given  the  fact  
that   V   and   T   inherit   features   from   their   dominating-­‐‑phase   heads   (v*   and   C  
respectively),  the  EPP  feature  in  T  can  be  reduced  to  (or  expressed  in  terms  of)  
an   inherited   version   of   the   EF   in   C,   without   clarifying,   in   any   case,   which  
exactly  is  the  nature  of  this  “inheritance”  process  or  the  EF  itself.  Gallego  (2010:  
62)  summarizes  all  these  possibilities  in  the  following  way:  
1) EPP1:  allows  LI  to  be  merged  
2) EPP2:  requires  Spec-­‐‑TP  to  be  filled  
3) EPP3:  creates  operator-­‐‑variable  relations  
We   can   see   that   the  proliferation  of   features   that  has   resulted   from   the  
extension   of   the   EF   effects   goes   against   any   pretention   of   substantive  
Minimalism.   I   will   therefore   try   to   reduce   this   machinery   to   the   minimum,  
while  still  accounting  for  the  whole  range  of  syntactic  operations.  
GB’s   Move   α   has   also   been   analyzed   as   an   instance   of   Merge.   If   a  
derivation  starts  from  a  lexical  array,  and  items  are  taken  and  merged  in  turn  in  
the  working  area  (External  merge),  “moving”  something  is  merely  re-­‐‑merging  a  
constituent,  or,  actually,  a  copy  of  that  constituent,  which  can  be  seen  as  another  
occurrence   of   that   particular   SO.  Movement  has   been   renamed   Internal  Merge  
for  that  reason,  a  probe  α  seeks  within  its  c-­‐‑command  domain  a  suitable  goal  β,  
features  are  matched,  [u-­‐‑F]  are  valued  and  then,  if  an  EF  in  α  requires  so,  β  is  
internally  merged   in   the   periphery   of   α,   leaving   behind   a   copy  which  will   not  
(normally)  be  Spelled  Out.    
Merge  also  brings  the  problem  of  labeling,  how  to  signal  headedness  and  
account  for  endocentricity,  since  it  seems  to  be  an  important  feature  of  human  
language   (I  will   return   to   this   point   later   on).  Chomsky   attempted   to   solve   it  
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with  a  simple  rule:  he  proposed  that  there  were  two  kinds  of  merge,  pair-­‐‑merge  
and   set-­‐‑merge   (Chomsky,   1998:   58).   In   the   former,   we   are   talking   about  
adjunction,  which   is  still  a  problem  in  minimalist   theory,   since  no  satisfactory  
theory  has  been  yet  proposed  (that  we  know  of).  In  those  cases,  if  we  externally-­‐‑
pair-­‐‑merge  α  to  β,  it  is  always  β  that  projects.  Chomsky  has  suggested  (2004)  that  
adjuncts  are  assembled  in  a  parallel  derivational  space,  and  then  introduced  in  
the  main  tree  by  means  of  an  old  mechanism:  a  generalized  transformation,  which,  
simplifying,   introduces   a   whole   tree   in   another.   Asymmetries   between  
arguments   and   adjuncts   are   thus   theoretically   enhanced.   In   set-­‐‑merge,   there   is  
some  “requirement”  of  α  which  is  satisfied  by  its  merger  with  β  (say,  argument  
structure),   and   it   is   α   that   projects.   The   labeling   algorithm   that   Chomsky  
proposes  can  be  summarized  as  follows  (Chomsky,  2005):  
i. In  {H,  α},  H  an  LI,  H  is  the  label  
ii. If  α  is  internally  merged  to  β,  forming  {α,  β},  then  the  label  of  β  is  the  
label  of  {α,  β}.  
The   problem   is   that   this   so-­‐‑called   algorithm   is   highly   stipulative,   and  
thus  has  to  be  replaced  with  an  interface-­‐‑driven  procedure  to  make  this  labeling  
principled.   As   regards   pair   merge,   we   would   need   to   encode   the   requirement  
relation   between   α   and   β   in   some   form,   most   probably   as   a   feature   (or   a  
subcategorization   frame),   an   option   against  which   I  will   argue,   since  we   put  
forth   (along   the   lines   proposed   by   Boeckx   and   Gallego)   that   Merge   is  
unbounded.  Besides,  my  goal  will  be  a  restrictivist  theory,  with  a  strong  presence  
of   the   interface   conditions,   not   a   constructivist   theory.   The   disadvantage  
presented  by  the  second  kind  of  theories  is  that,  as  their  goal  is  to  generate  only  
convergent  objects,  they  need  a  number  of  filters  /  ad  hoc  principles  within  the  
computational  system  itself,  therefore  preventing  some  mergers  not  because  of  
interface   conditions,   but   because   some   stipulated   syntactic   filter.   Our   model  
will   aim   to   construct  a   restrictivist   theory,   in  which  Merge   is   free  and   the  only  
“filters”   for   representations   are   the   interface   conditions.   These   conditions  
determine  the  set  of  what  is  known  as  “convergent  derivations”,  a  subset  of  the  
possible   derivations.   Although   one   may   argue   against   restrictivism   by   saying  
that  it  is  more  costly  than  constructivism  since  all  kinds  of  objects  may  reach  the  
interface  levels,  this  can  be  easily  counter  argued.  We  must  think  of  derivations  
not  only   in  computational   terms  but  also   in  biological   terms   (that   is,  we  have   to  
take   into   account   biological   plausibility   when   positing   an   operation   or   a  
constraint   on   derivations   /   representations),   as   information   is   transmitted  
between   connected   neurons.   Recurrent   connections   are   rutinized   (i.e.,  
automated),   and   non-­‐‑convergent   derivations,   although   computationally  
possible  (since,  as  I  have  said,  Merge  is  unbounded  and  free),  are  ruled  out  by  
interface   conditions   at   first   and   by   statistics   later   on.   We   must   also   take   into  
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account   that,   if   we   choose   a   Distributed   Morphology   framework   with   Late  
Insertion,  we  operate  with  the  following  principle  on  the  road  to  SM3:  
(2)  Morpheme  formation  constraint:  
We  cannot  group  features   in  a   terminal  node   (i.e.,  morpheme)   if   there   is  no  vocabulary  
item  in  the  B  List  specified  enough  to  be  inserted  in  that  node.  
Bear   in  mind   that   this   is  not  a  principle,   but  a  descriptive   constraint   that  
could  replace  typological  parameters,  like  Verb-­‐‑framed  /  Satellite-­‐‑framed  languages:  
if  Spanish  does  not  have  a  VI  to  Spell-­‐‑Out  both  Manner  and  Motion,  those  two  
primitives  would  not  be  allowed  to  be  put  together,  thus  accounting  for  the  lack  
of  resultative  and  Path-­‐‑of-­‐‑Motion  constructions  (see  Mateu,  2000a,  b).  Of  course,  
one  has  to  distinguish  yet  “uncoined”  words  (any  neologism,  for  example)  from  
impossible   words.   Uncoined   words   may   be   formed   in   the   (l-­‐‑)syntax   if   the  
intention  of  the  speaker,  already  in  the  form  of  a  Relational  Semantic  Structure  
(RSS,  see  Mateu,  2000a,  b),  requires  so,  and  a  vocabulary  item  may  be  created  ad  
hoc  following  the  regular  morphological  rules  of  the  language  in  question  to  be  
inserted   post-­‐‑syntactically.   For   example,   we   can   imagine   a   location   verb   [to  
table],   but   there   is   no   way   of   forming   [to   wind]   if   [wind]   is   the   external  
argument,  as  in  [the  wind  blows].  If  we  have  a  root,  it  should  be  matched  with  a  
phonological  exponent  as  soon  as  possible  (Pesetsky’s  Earliness  Principle),  and  if  
one  considers  that  all  unergative  Vs  are  actually  transitive  with  conflation  (Hale  
&  Keyser,   2002),  procrastinate   conflation  of   the  “complement”  of   the  eventive  
node   to   wait   until   the   “external   argument”   of   the   causative   node   is   merged  
would   violate   not   a   syntactic   principle,   but   a   very   basic   computational  
efficiency  desideratum.  Let  us  assume  that  we  have  [XP  ZP  [X’  [X0]  YP]]  and  X0  is  
defective,   either  phonologically  or   semantically.   If  we   consider   the  diachronic  
dimension   of   the   derivation,   as   soon   as   we   have   [X’   [X0]   YP],   following   the  
Earliness  Principle,  the  conflation  process  must  occur.  There  is  no  need  (and,  what  
is  more,   it  would  be  an  anti-­‐‑economical  option)  to  wait  until  ZP  is  merged.  In  
the   derivation   of   words,   for   example   (which   are   no   different   from   the  
derivation  of  sentences),  we  should  take  into  account:  
a) Conservation  Principle  
b) Morpheme  Formation  Constraint  
c) Routinized  neurological  connections  
Let   us   consider   a   derivation   from   the   very   beginning:   the   semantic-­‐‑
pragmatic   “global   plan”   (Bernárdez,   1982).   I   assume,   not   innocently,   that   that  
intention  is  "ʺembodied"ʺ  in  a  Relational  Semantic  Structure,  which  is  formed  by  
merging   generic   concepts   in   a   pre-­‐‑syntactic   conceptual  module,   say,   C-­‐‑I1.  Note  
the   fact   that,   if   conceptual   addresses   can  be   freely   combined   in  both  Boeckx'ʹs  
and  our  model  just  because  of  their  common  format,  there  is  nothing  principled  
                                                                                                 
3  J.L.  Stamboni,  p.c.  His  view,  however,  differs  from  ours  in  a  number  of  points.  
  ©  Iberia:  An  International  Journal  of  Theoretical  Linguistics   vol  3.2,  2011,  20-­‐‑62  
http://www.siff.us.es/iberia/index.php/ij/index   ISSN  1989-­‐‑8525  
26   An  introduction  to  Radical  Minimalism  I  
that  can  ban  Merge  of  generic  concepts,  as  they  also  share  "ʺformat"ʺ.  This  RSS  is  
not  manipulable  by  FL,  as  generic  concepts  are,  as  we  have  said  in  other  works,  
not   linguistic   entities,   semantically   underspecified,   and   therefore,   LF-­‐‑defective  
(Panagiotidis,   2009,   2010).   The   information  conveyed   by   the   RSS   must   be  
carried   along   the   derivation   because   of  (a),   and   so   generic   concepts   are  
instantiated  as  linguistically  manipulable  units,  which  we  will  refer  to  as  “roots”  
(and   that   are   equivalent   to   Boeckx'ʹs   conceptual   addresses).   Now,   we   have  
linguistic   entities,   but   pre-­‐‑categorial   linguistic   entities,   therefore,   interface-­‐‑
defective.   The   difference  with   concepts   in   this   respect   is   that   concepts   are   a-­‐‑
categorial,   that   is,   they  cannot  (and  need  not)  bear  a  category.  Category   is  not  
needed   in   the   syntax   (or   at   least   not   if  we   consider   that  Merge   applies   freely  
and  syntax  is  blind),  but  it  is  needed  in  order  to  build  an  explicature  in  the  post-­‐‑
syntactic   instance   of   C-­‐‑I.   Pre-­‐‑categoriality   means   that   roots   have   the   "ʺinner  
potentiality"ʺ   to   be   verbs   or   nouns,   by   virtue   of   their   quantum   categorial  
dimension.   Can   we   say   that   certain   roots   are   more   likely   to   collapse   to   one  
state  or  the  other?  No,  we  cannot  do  so  in  a  Radically  Minimalist  framework,  as  
it   would   be   an   unprincipled   statement.   We  must   solve   it   otherwise.   Let   us  
consider   the   case  of  CAT.   Is   it  possible   to   form  a  verbal  morpheme   (that   is,   a  
syntactic  terminal  node)  to  which  a  phonological  piece  /kæt/  corresponds?  Yes,  
if   the   underlying   construal   has   [CAT]   (the   generic   concept)   in   a   legitimate  
position.  We  cannot  form  a  verb  [V  cat]  from  a  semantic  construal  where  CAT  is  
on   Spec-­‐‑R   (the   causative   node),   since  we  would   be  conflating   the   Spec   into   a  
Head,  and  such  an  operation  would  require  many  stipulations.  This  verb  would  
be   an   impossible   word.   If   [CAT]   is  on   Compl-­‐‑r,   for   example,   we   could   form   a  
locatum  /   location  verb   [V  cat]   (for  example,   "ʺto  cat  a  mouse"ʺ,  meaning  [CAUSE  
[GO   [[mouse]   [TO]   [cat]]]]   in  Mateu'ʹs   terms),   and   that  would  merely  be  a  yet  
uncoined   word,   but   perfectly   possible,   and   “parseable”.   The  Morpheme   Formation  
Constraint   does   not   help   when   the  morpheme   has   been   formed   according   to  
“long-­‐‑known   principles   of   syntax”   (think   of   GB’s   principles,   for   example).  
However,   routinized   neurological   connections   do.  Bear   in  mind   that   only  Merge  
comes  “for  free”  (by  conceptual  necessity),  the  "ʺlexicon"ʺ  (by  which  we  mean  the  
inventory  of   phonological   pieces,   a   purely   socio-­‐‑historical   product),  is   learned.  
Learning   is   a   process   of   adjustment   of   neurological   connections,  and   when  
recurrent  neurological  flows  (to  use  a  metaphor)  are  routinized,  the  connection  
is  made  quicker,  almost  automatic  (in  a  Fodorian  way).  
As   a   provisional   conclusion,   I   will   say   that   the   operation  Merge   may   be  
blind,   but   the  mind-­‐‑brain   is   certainly  not.   Interface   conditions   (which  mediate   in  
the   communication   between   mental   faculties)   reject   any   malformed  
representation  when  it  reaches  the  interface  levels,  since  my  theory  is  restrictive.  
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1.2.  Hornstein  &  Pietroski  (2009)  
These   authors   take  Merge   to   be   a   composite   operation,  made  up  of   (a)  
Concatenate  and   (b)  Label.  The   first  operation  merely  puts  two   things   together,  
be  them  simple  or  complex  (without  any  implications  for  linearization  purposes,  
apparently),  and  the  second  operation,  applied  to  the  results  of  the  first,  leaves  
that  complex  {α,  β}  as  a  single  unit  for  the  purposes  of  further  operations  (thus  
avoiding   generation   of   syntactic   objects   -­‐‑SO-­‐‑   like   {α,   β,   γ},   which  would   not  
yield  a   linguistic  expression),   the  label   indicating  which  is  the  head  of   the  new  
syntactic   object,   taking   that   every   symbolic   hierarchical   structure   is,   in   fact,  
endocentric.  Concatenate  operates  only  on  “atoms”  (whichever  their  nature),  SOs  
that  are  already  labeled  and  are  therefore  considered  atomic  for  the  effect  of  a  
new  concatenation.    The  label  operation  must  take  the  (categorial)  features  of  one  
of   the  elements  and  project   them  so  that   the  result  of   the  operation  is   that   the  
label   is   either   α   or   β.   Hornstein   &   Pietroski   postulate   that,   apparently,  
concatenate   is   an   ancient   operation,   available   in   animal   cognition   as   well   as  
human   cognition,   in   their   own  words,   concatenation   is   an   instruction   to   conjoin  
monadic   concepts,   and   nothing   else.   This   can   be   seen   as   a   deviation   from   the  
point  of  view  exposed  in  Hauser,  Chomsky  and  Fitch  (2002),  to  whom  recursion  
(the  core  characteristic  of  Merge)   is  an  exclusive   feature  of  FLN,  and   thus  not  
available  in  non-­‐‑human  systems.  Hornstein  &  Pietroski  find  a  “semantic  correlate”  
of  concatenate,  to  account  for  compositional  meaning,  that  is,  the  meaning  of  the  
whole  depending  on  the  meaning  of  the  parts  and  the  relations  between  them.  I  
do   not   understand   why   it   is   necessary   for   them   to   distinguish   these   two  
instantiations  of   a   combinatory  operation,  but  my  objection  will   be   clear  only  
when  I  have  already  exposed  my  own  view.  
In   the   same   way   they   have   decomposed   (external)   merge,   they  
decompose  move  (i.e,  internal  merge).  The  whole  sketch  would  look  like  this:  
(3) Move  =  [Merge  [Copy]]  
Merge  =  [Label  [Concatenate]]    
The   label   operation   is   said   to   have   roots   in   EST,   resembling   rewriting  
rules.   In   this   framework,   labeling   is   taken   as   “interpreting   as…”   Thus,  
simplifying  on  behalf  of  clarity,  
(4) VP  →  V,  NP  
Amounts   to  saying  “the  node  VP  must  be   interpreted  as  composed  by  V  
and  NP”.  The  dynamics  of  merge  would  work   the  other  way  around,  we   first  
concatenate  {V,  NP}  and  then  label  the  construction  as  a  VP.  However,  we  are  not  
told  how  this  labeling  algorithm  is  working,  that  is,  it  is  not  made  explicit.  As  a  
consequence,   there   is  no  principled  reason  why  {V,  NP}  should  be   labeled  VP  
(or   simply  V   in   a   BPS   framework)   and   not  NP,   apart   from  mere   intuition   or  
intra-­‐‑theoretic  stipulation.  
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1.3.  Boeckx  (2006,  2009,  2010)  
Boeckx’s  proposal  also  involves  decomposing  Merge  into  operations  that,  
separately   considered,   might   be   available   in   other   mental   domains   than  
language,   but   together   they   are   apparently   unique   to   the   Language   Faculty.  
According  to  Boeckx,  endocentricity  in  hierarchical  structures  is  very  language-­‐‑
specific  (or,  put  in  different  words,  part  of  FLN),  and  is  made  possible  by  two  
different  operations:  
a) Concatenate  (or  Basic  Grouping)  
b) Copy  
These  operations  are  presented  by  Boeckx  as  an  instance  of  what  Gould  
(2002)  called  Umbildung,  that  is,  recombination,  using  things  already  available  in  
separate   biological   systems   to   form   something   new.   These   ancient   operations  
taken  separately  can  be  said  to  be  part  of  FLB  as  they  are  used  in  other  faculties,  
but  combined   they  characterize  and  define  FLN.  Contrary   to  what  some  have  
said,  concatenation  does  not  entail   linear  order,  but  simply  “putting  two  things  
together”  (whatever  these  things  turn  out  to  be,  as  long  as  they  share  “format”).  
The   copying   operation   is   a   bit   more   complex,   as   it   entails   giving   the   newly  
formed  structure  the  character  of  one  of  its  components,  or,  what  is  equivalent,  
establishing  which   its   head   is.   If  we   do   this,  we   can   use   the  whole   structure  
(complex  as  it  might  be)  as  a  unit  for  the  purposes  of  new  combination.    
Combination   is   neither   determined   in   any   way   by   nor   sensible   to   the  
nature   of   the   elements   that   it   combines,   for   if   it  were,   then   it   could   never   be  
regarded  as  an  operation  available  in  multiple  faculties.  Copying,  however,  is  of  
a  more  obscure  nature,  since  it  must  have  some  access  to  the  categorial  features  
or  equivalent  (in  the  case  of  language)  of  the  elements  it  manipulates  in  order  to  
copy  them  and  label   the  new  structure.  This  can  be   implied  from  the  fact   that  
the   result   of  merging  X   and  Y   is   not   a  new   structure  Z,   but   either  X  or  Y.   In  
order   to   do   this,   the   system  must   see   something   to   copy;   the   first   thing   that  
comes   to   our   mind   would   be   categorial   features,   as   I   have   already   said.   The  
results  of   these  operations  are  hierarchical   endocentric  binary-­‐‑branched  structures,  
which  are,  in  his  view,  unique  to  human  language.  
The   nature   of   the   combined   elements   is   also   discussed.   Boeckx   (2010)  
makes  a  distinction  between  concepts  and  conceptual  addresses,  which  is  parallel  
to   that  made   in  Krivochen  (2010d)  between  generic  concepts  and  roots.  Concepts  
are  not  linguistic  entities  but  more  abstract  elements  which  I  take  to  be  carrying  
some  sort  of    “meaning”,  and  as  such,  they  may  be  shared  with  other  species  as  
they  are  accessed  by  other  faculties  apart  from  FL,   like  the  visual  module  (see  
discussion   in   Krivochen,   2010d).   Conceptual   addresses,   on   the   other   hand,   are  
(pre-­‐‑syntactic)   linguistic   entities   which   “point   to”   concepts   (or   convey  
instructions   to   “activate”   concepts),   and   they   are   freely  merged   because   they  
share  a  common  format,  not  because  there  is  a  feature  like  Chomsky’s  EF  that  is  
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driving   merge.   It   would   take   a   special   stipulation   to   restrict   Merge   of  
conceptual  addresses  in  the  syntax,  any  restriction  or  constraint  one  would  like  
to   posit   (in   a   theory   like   Boeckx’s   2010   or   our   own)   comes   into   play   in   the  
interface  levels,  post-­‐‑syntactically.  That  is,  I  think,  an  important  step  towards  a  
really  minimalist  theory  of  language,  and  I  will  develop  this  below  in  detail.                                                                  
Boeckx   (2010)   points   out,   and   I   agree,   that   feature   bundles   cannot   be  
driving  syntax,  since  these  bundles  are  structures  and  that  structure  is  (must  be)  
syntactic   in   very   much   the   road   taken   by   Distributed   Morphology   (Halle   &  
Marantz,   1993,   Embick   &   Noyer,   2004,   Panagiotidis,   2010),   in   which   it   is  
considered   that   roots   and   “f-­‐‑morphemes”   (to   use   the   old   DM   term)   are  
combined  syntactically,  with  the  same  constraints  that  apply  to  an  “s-­‐‑syntactic”  
representation   (like  HMC,   etc.).   The   elements   the   syntax  manipulates   should  
optimally  be  atomic,  and  Merge  should  be  taken,  in  his  view,  as  a  free-­‐‑triggered  
unbounded  operation,  Merge  α.  The  whole  argumentation  of  Boeckx’s  aims  at  
“defeating   lexicocentrism”,   that   is,   the   presence   of   a   pre-­‐‑syntactic   instance  
where   fully-­‐‑fledged   lexical   items   are   taken   from.   Contrarily   to   Chomsky’s  
(2002,   2005b)   claims,   the   “great   leap   forward”   (that   is,   the   qualitative  
evolutionary   difference   between   humans   and   non-­‐‑humans)   would   be   the  
emergence  of  conceptual  addresses,  not  Merge  itself,  since  it  is  really  a  recombination  
of  pre-­‐‑existing  processes.    
1.4.  Our  view  (Krivochen  2010b,  d)  
I  have  already  presented  my  view  on  Merge  on  previous  works,  but  here  
I  will  try  to  go  deeper  in  my  analysis,  seeking  the  motivations  for  the  mergers  
and   trying   to   implement   the   whole   machinery   in   a   radically   minimalist  
restrictivist  theory.  First  of  all,  I  have  to  address  two  questions:  
a) Is  Merge  feature-­‐‑driven?  
b) Do  we  really  have  to  decompose  merge?  
My  answer  for  both  questions  will  be  no.  I  will  now  address  each  in  turn,  
analyzing  what  happens   in  C(HL)   and   then   in   the   interface   levels,   to  put   some  
order  in  the  architecture  of  the  grammar.  
Merge,  as  I  take  it,  is  a  completely  free  operation  that  can  apply  as  long  
as  the  objects  to  which  it  applies  have  the  same  format,  motivated  by  interface  
conditions   (this   is,   {α}   is   trivial   in   the   interface   levels,  while   {α,  β}   is  not,   as   I  
have   said4).   In   FL,  we  have   lexical   items5,   and  we   can   say   that   they  have   the  
                                                                                                 
4  Boban  Arsenijevic  (p.c)  claims  that     “{{a}}  is  non-­‐‑trivial  in  at  least  one  faculty:  the  
arithmetic   capacity.   Hence,   output   conditions   can'ʹt   be   that   bare   to   favor   a   binary   merge”.  
However,  my  position  is   that   if  Merge  is  considered  to  be  an  operation  and  I  assume  
also  a  dynamic  version  of  Full  Interpretation  that  states  that  any  derivational  step  must  be  
interface-­‐‑justified,  that  is,  the  application  of  any  operation  must  lead  to  a  legible  object  –
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same  format  (be  them  “lexical  categories”  or  “functional  categories”)  since  they  
share  a  nature,  they  are  linguistic  instantiations  of  elements  that,  per  se,  are  not  
manipulable   by   C(HL)   .   The   only   attribute   of   Merge   would   be   putting   things  
together,  without  any  restriction  by  principle  as  regards  the  nature  or  number  
of  objects,   since   it  would  be  a   stipulation.   Is  binarity   an   interface   requirement,  
then?   Yes   and   no.   Binarity   is   the   simplest-­‐‑non-­‐‑trivial   combination   of   elements,  
and  syntax  (in  the  broad  sense)  is  fundamentally  economical:  there  is  simply  no  
point  in  applying  Merge  to  {α},  thus  generating  {{α}},  if  the  latter  object  is  in  no  
way  “more  legible”  than  the  former.  If  {α}  is  not  interpretable,  for  some  reason,  
there  is  no  motive  to  believe  that  {{α}}  will  be  interpretable,  since  it  reduces  to  
{α}.   But   there   is   also   an   interface   requirement,   related   with   the   problem   of  
labeling,   that   makes   binarity   a   (third-­‐‑factor)   principled   property   of   linguistic  
hierarchical   structures   (Chomsky,   2005b).   Because   of   these   asymmetries,   in  
Krivochen   (2010b)   I   have   made   the   (purely   descriptive)   distinction   between  
syntax  in  the  narrow  sense  and  syntax  in  the  broad  sense.  The  former  refers  to  the  
recursive   combinatory  procedure  of   FL,  what   is  usually   referred   to   as  Merge.  
The   latter   refers   to   the   recursive   combinatory   procedure   no   matter   which  
module   one   is   talking   about   (C-­‐‑I,   the   faculty   of   music,   the   mathematical  
capacity).  Of  course,  my  hypothesis  is  that  there  is  only  one  generative  mechanism  
in   the   human  mind,   and   that   is  Merge,   but   for   the   sake   of   clarity   I   have   found  
useful   to   make   the   terminological   distinction   presented   above.   Optimally,   of  
course,   the   theory   should   dispense   with   this   distinction   and   recognize   that  
there  is  only  one  operation  whose  apparent  variations  correlate  to  differences  in  
the  characteristics  of  the  objects  it  is  manipulating  and  the  interface  conditions  
the   generated   representation   must   fulfill,   a   factor   totally   external   to,   and  
different  from,  Merge  itself.  
My  hypothesis   (and  here   I   start   answering   the   second  question)   is   also  
that  Merge   does   not   entail   labeling,   in   fact,   syntax   (in   the   “narrow   sense”)   can  
dispense  with  labels.  Labels  are  used  to  indicate  which  is  the  head  of  the  relevant  
phrase,  that  is,  which  element  will  determine  the  properties  of  the  fully-­‐‑fledged  
phrase.  However,  I  will  argue,  these  properties  are  not  relevant  to  syntax  but  to  
the  C-­‐‑I  component  in  the  construction  of  the  explicature.  Take,  for  example,  (i):  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
or   increase   the   informational   load-­‐‑,   to  apply  Merge   to  a   single  object   is   trivial   in  any  
faculty.  If  {a}  is  already  legible  in  the  relevant  interface  level,  then  why  apply  Merge  in  
the   first   place?   It   would   be   computationally   redundant,   and   therefore   far   from  
Minimalist.  I  maintain  that  binary  Merge  is  the  minimal-­‐‑maximal  non-­‐‑trivial  option.  I  
therefore  reject  any  proposal  of  unitary  Merge  on  interface  grounds.    
5  As   a   matter   of   fact,   we   have   roots   semantically   defective   and   procedural  
features  that  make  them  manipulable  by  the  computational  system,  but  I  will  use  the  
term  “lexical  items”  for  the  time  being.  See  infra.  
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(5) Merge  (love,  Mary)  =  {love,  Mary}  
According   to   Gallego   (2010:   15)   in   (i),   the   system   sees   no   difference  
between  [love]  and  [Mary],  and  he  wants  to  formalize  somehow  that  it  is  [love]  
that  selects  [Mary],  and  no  the  other  way  around,  so  labels  are  necessary  in  the  
syntax.  However,  my  question  would  be  the  following:  why  would  the  system  
want  to  know  that  there  is  some  “selection”  relation  if  Merge  is  unbounded  and  
the  syntax  is  a  purely  generative  engine  (not  an  interpretative  one)?  If  there  is  no  
s/c-­‐‑selection   anymore,   no   subcategorization   frames   in   a   “monolithic”   lexicon,  
there  is  no  way  of  representing  this  “selection”  computationally.  All  the  syntax  
can   “see”   is   two   elements   with   a   common   format   (two   lexical   items   in  
“traditional  Minimalism”,  or,  in  Boeckx’s  terms,  conceptual  addresses)  that  can  be  
put   together  with   no   restrictions   apart   from   basic   economy   considerations.   If  
they  can  be  merged,  then  there  is  no  principled  reason  why  they  should  not  be.  
A   hierarchical   representation   of   a   ditransitive   structure   in   C(HL)   could  
look  like  this  (of  course,   it   is  not  a  complete  tree,  as  I  have  comprised  Split  TP  








Syntax  only  cares  about  combination  or  concatenation  (in  Boeckx’s  2009  
sense),   because   there   is   nothing   more   than   a   generative   mechanism,   not   an  
interpretative   one.   However,   the   tree   above  would   be   illegible   to   the   semantic  
component.   In   order   to   build   an   explicature,   C-­‐‑I   needs   a   Logical   Form   (in  
Relevance  Theory’s   terms),   a   subspecified  or   incomplete   representation  of   the  
propositional  content  with  procedural  instructions  to  decode,  disambiguate,  assign  
referents  and  enrich  semantically  those  elements  that  need  so.    
Take  the  ditransitive  structure  above,  for  example.6  If  we  merge  D  and  P,  
that   is   all   we   do   in   the   syntax,   but   in   the   semantic   interface   there   are   three  
options:  either  we  do  nothing,  or  we  take  the  structure  to  be  headed  by  D,  or  we  
take   it   to   be   headed   by   P.   Labeling   does   not   really  matters   to   C(HL),   because  
merge   is   unrestricted   there,   but   it   is   a   great   way   of   signaling   “headedness”  
either  for  the  linguist  (as  a  descriptive  tool)  and  for  the  inferential  component,  
                                                                                                 
6  A  thorough  analysis  of  these  structures  and  a  justification  for  labeling  is  given  












Syntax only cares about FRPELQDWLRQRUFRQFDWHQDWLRQLQ%RHFN[¶VVHQVHEHFDXVH
there is nothing more than a generative mechanism, not an interpretative one. However, 
the tree above would be illegible to the semantic component. In order to build an 
explicature, C-I needs a Logical Form (in Relevance Theory¶VWHUPV), a subspecified or 
incomplete representation of the propositional content with procedural instructions to 
decode, disambiguate, assign referents and enrich semantically those elements that need 
so.  
 
Take the ditransitive tructure above, for example.7 If we merge D and P, that is all we do 
in the syntax, bu  n the s mantic interface there are three options: either we do nothing, or 
we take the s ructure o be headed by D, or we take it to be headed by P. Labeling does not 
really matters to C(HL), beca se merge is unrestricted there, but it  a great w y of signaling 
³KHDGHGQHVV´HLWKHUIRUWKHOLQJXLVW(as a descriptive tool) and for th  inferenti l 
component, the post-syntactic instance of C-I, but this does not amount to saying that 
headedness is actually a fundamental feature of language, as Boeckx and others have put 
forth. Chomsky (in discussion with Cedric Boeckx) argues that ³,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW
headedness is a property of language. I think it is an epiphenomenon, and there is nothing 
simpler than Merge´7KH³HSLSKHQRPHQLF´FKDUDFWHURIKHDGHGQHVV is given by the fact 
that it is only required by a C-I requirement, but not by the narrow syntax. Returning to our 
                                                   
7 A thorough analysis of these structures and a justification for labeling is given in Krivochen (2010b, d), and 
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the   post-­‐‑syntactic   instance   of   C-­‐‑I,   but   this   does   not   amount   to   saying   that  
headedness   is  actually  a  fundamental  feature  of  language,  as  Boeckx  and  others  
have  put  forth.  Chomsky  (in  discussion  with  Cedric  Boeckx)  argues  that  “I  don’t  
think   that   headedness   is   a   property   of   language.   I   think   it   is   an   epiphenomenon,   and  
there   is   nothing   simpler   than   Merge”.   The   “epiphenomenic”   character   of  
headedness  is  given  by  the  fact  that  it  is  only  required  by  a  C-­‐‑I  requirement,  but  
not  by  the  narrow  syntax.  Returning  to  our  ditransitive  structure,  if  we  “label”  
the   resulting   merger   as   D,   all   the   procedural   instructions   of   P   are   lost,   no  
relation  between   figure  and  ground   can  be  established  because   there   is  neither  a  
figure  nor  a  ground,  as  they  are  purely  relational  concepts.  Of  course,  they  do  not  
exist  in  the  narrow  syntax,  but  the  relation  in  nevertheless  there,  and  it  is  P  that  
establishes   it.   The   same   happens  when  we  merge  V,  which   introduces   in   the  
derivation  an  [EVENT]  dimension.  We  can  interpret   it  as  two  things:  an  event  
that  includes  a  spatial  relation  or  an  extended  spatial  relation  which  somehow  
includes  an  event.  Interpretation  seems  to  be  determined  by  scope,  and  since  the  
eventive  head  c-­‐‑commands  the  spatial  relation,  it  has  scope  over  it.  Interpreting  
{V,  {PP}}  as  P  would  lead  the  derivation  to  a  crash,  as  I  assume  that  there   is  a  
one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  relation  between  “projections”  (in  the  sense  of  “labels”)  and  types  of  
information  encoded  in  heads.  That  is,  we  cannot  have  a  single  projection  (let  us  
say,  for  the  sake  of  clarity,  a  PP)  with  two  features  of  different  nature,  conveying  
different   information:   a   P   head   conveying   spatial   information   relating   figure  
and  ground   in  terms  of  central  or  terminal  coincidence  and  a  V  head  conveying  
eventive  information  in  terms  of  telic  or  atelic  events.  Thus,  so-­‐‑called  “maximal  
projections”   can   be   taken   as   “informational   domains”   in   terms   of   interface  
conditions.   That   is,   when   monotonic   merge   builds   an   object   and   that   object  
conveys  a  certain  type  of  information  which  the  next  merged  element  does  not  
convey,   the   “projection”   is   closed   in   terms   of   labeling,   but   this   occurs   only  
because   of   interface   conditions.7  The   whole   picture   would   look   like   this   (I   use  
traditional  X-­‐‑bar  labels  for  the  sake  of  clarity):  
(7) {D,  {P,  D}}  =  P  (domain  of  spatial  information)  
(8) {event,  {P}}  =  V  (domain  of  eventive  information)  
(9) {cause,  {event}}  =  v  projection  (domain  of  causativity)  
(10) {D  (EA),  {cause,  {event}}}  =  full  causative  projection.  
A  note  has   to  be  made   regarding   the   last   two  points.   I  have  put  “(full)  
causative   projection”,   without   any   bar-­‐‑level   indication,   because   I   agree   with  
Chomsky   (1994)   in   the   invisibility   (or,   more   accurately,   irrelevancy)   of  
                                                                                                 
7  The  domains  are  “contextually  defined”,  and   in   that  sense,   they  may  remind  
Grohmann’s   (2003,   2004)   “Prolific   Domains”,   but   the   reader   must   bear   in   mind   the  
multiple  differences  between  both  theories.  
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intermediate   projections.8  The   question   is:   is   there   any   relevance   in   XP   (X’’)  
notation?  I  think  there  is  not.  The  [X]P  is  just  a  notational  form  of  indicating  that  
the   relevant   domain   is   closed,   that   is,   the   next   head   conveys   another   type   of  
information.  It  is  a  form  of  signaling  the  end  of  a  “contextually  defined”  domain  in  C-­‐‑I  
terms.   Bear   in   mind   that   this   “label   identification”   process   takes   place   post-­‐‑
syntactically,  C(HL)  manipulates  bare  structures  like  (i)  above,  whose  “parts”  are  
transferred  as  soon  as  a  fully  interpretable  object  is  formed  in  terms  of  interface  
conditions,  if  the  interfaces  can  “peer  into”  the  syntax  and  Analyze  structures  in  
real  time.  By  these  means,  I  can  dispense  not  only  with  labels  in  the  syntax,  but  
also   simplify   the   labeling  procedure   for   LF   (which  we  will   always  use   in   the  
sense  of  Relevance  Theory)  formation.  No  matter  how  we  indicate  it,  vP,  v  [+  máx]  [-­‐‑  
mín]  or  just  cause,  this  fully-­‐‑fledged  syntactic  object  is  interpreted  as  a  caused  event  
that   includes   a   spatial   relation,   and   I   have  deduced  all   this  without   resorting   to  
stipulations.   The   indications   EA   and   IA   (External   and   Internal   Arguments),  
which  are   frequently  used   in  papers  on   linguistics,   and   that  we  have  used  as  
well,   are   likewise   nothing   more   than   a   descriptive   tool,   as   “internal”   and  
“external”   argument   distinction   makes   no   sense   if   there   is   nothing   to   be  
external  of  in  the  syntax  (that  is,  if  there  are  no  VPs  at  all  and  headedness  is  an  
epiphenomenon,  interface-­‐‑motivated).  EA  /  IA  /  Loc,  etc.  are  descriptive  terms  
for   (mostly)   semantic   concepts   defined   in   the   construction   of   the   explicature,  
based  on  the  position  that  DPs  assume  in  the  syntactic  configuration,  as  I  have  
posited  in  Krivochen  (2010c).  
Gallego   (2010:   20),   when   discussing   phase-­‐‑level   labeling,   argues   against  
approaches   like  my  own  or  Collins’   (2002)  by   listing  some  phenomena  whose  
explanation  and  proper  characterization  allegedly  requires  labels:  
a) Displacement  /  Pied  Piping  
b) Islands  
c) Ellipsis  




h) Adjuncts  vs.  Complements  
Our  task  now  will  be  to  try  to  demonstrate  that  either  these  phenomena  
do  not  occur  in  the  syntax  but  in  the  way  to  the  external  systems  or  that  if  they  
                                                                                                 
8  Both   Kayne   (1994)   and   Chomsky   (1994,   1995)   argued   against   intermediate  
projections,  so  that  instead  of  [XP  Spec  [X’  [X  X]  Compl  ]]  we  would  have  [XP  Spec  [XP  [X  X]  
Compl]].  Both  had  different  theoretical  reasons  and,  for  us,  Kayne’s  argument  is  a  bit  
more  solid  than  Chomsky’s,  since  it  relies  on  LCA  (assimilating  Specs-­‐‑  with  Adjuncts).  
Chomsky  simply  stipulates  that  C(HL)  can  only  “see”  XPs  and  X0.  
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occur  in  the  syntax,  they  can  be  explained  without  resorting  to  labels.  Of  course,  
I  probably  will  give  a  convincing  argument  for  each,  but  my  intention  is  clear:  
Radical  Minimalism  seeks  elimination  of  labels  in  the  working  area,  and  if  I  can  
eliminate   some   other   problems   along   the  way,   even   better.   These   points  will  
surely  set  the  agenda  for  future  research  in  Radical  Minimalism.  
1) Displacement:   the   dynamics   of   movement   are   yet   unclear,   despite   the  
huge   amount   of   work   done   about   it,   since   I   claim   against   a   feature-­‐‑
driven   Merge,   it   would   be   contradictory   to   say   that   internal   merge   is  
driven  by  the  need  to  check  some  feature  or  so.9  It  is  not  even  clear  where  
it  takes  place,  if  in  the  narrow  syntax,  as  it  has  been  the  traditional  view  
or   in   the  PF  branch,  as  Moro   (2000)   claims.   If   the   latter,  we  should  ask  
ourselves  if  PF  is   label-­‐‑sensitive,  which  would  have  a  negative  answer  in  
our  framework,  since  we  have  argued  that,  if  labels  exist  at  all,  they  are  
only  of  relevance  to  LF,  as   informational  domains  seem  to  be  irrelevant  
for   prosodic   purposes.   This   point   is   one   of   the   most   conflictive,   and  
certainly   requires   further   investigation.   An   even   more   basic   question,  
which  is  actually  under  research,  is  if  movement  should  be  interpreted  as  
displacement  at  all,  or  all  we  have  is  actually  External  Merge.  
2) Islands:   islandhood   should   be   subsumed   to   phasehood,   in   an   optimal  
theory.   That   is,   I   see   no   point   in   having   two   locality   conditions,   two  
differentiated  restrictions  upon  movement  and  extraction.  By  unifying  all  
“barrier-­‐‑like”  phenomena,  we  are  in  the  track  of  a  much  simpler  theory,  
especially   if   we   take   a   principled   definition   of   phase,   like   my   own   (see  
Krivochen   2010b   and   below)   or  Grohmann’s   (2003,   2004,  with   the   due  
comments,  made  in  my  2010b  article).    
3) Ellipsis:  I  see  no  reason  to  resort  to  labels  in  an  explanation  of  ellipsis,  if  
we   say   that   a   term   can   be   elided   only   if   there   is   a   structurally   higher  
phonological  occurrence  of  a  parallel  term  (that  is,  we  are  talking  of  two  
different  tokens,  but  with  the  same  phonological  form).  In  those  cases,  we  
can   apply   a   generic   vocabulary   insertion   in   the   lowest   term,   via  
“massive”  fusion  (in  DM  terms),  say,  a  pro-­‐‑form  [do].  Of  course,  there  is  
the  question  of  what  can  be  elided  and  what  cannot,  the  determination  of  
the  aforementioned  terms.  That  determination  is  not  done  in  the  syntax,  
but  depends  on  what  can  be  interpreted  in  the  explicature  level  and  the  
availability   in   the   B-­‐‑List   of   a   pro-­‐‑form   specified   enough   in   terms   of  
                                                                                                 
9  In  Krivochen  (2010c,  2011)  I  argue  that  movement  of  the  subject  to  Spec-­‐‑TP  can  
be  explained  in  terms  of  theme-­‐‑rheme  dynamics  (and,  therefore,  it  would  be  driven  by  a  
requirement   of   the   semantic   component),   instead   of   resorting   to   an   EPP   feature.  
Chomsky   has   apparently   explored   this   theory   in   his  MIT   1995   courses   (according   to  
Uriagereka,  1998),  but  he  has  not  explicitly  formulated  it  in  any  paper  I  know  of.  
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features   to   fill   the   gap,   for   example,   [do]   (related  with   the  Transitional  
node   in   RSS)   cannot   replace   just   a   spatial   domain   (i.e.,   PP),   but   there  
must  be  some  [EVENT]  primitive   in   the  elided  structure.  A   label-­‐‑based  
ellipsis  would  work   for  a  constructivist   theory,  but   that   is  not  our  aim.  
Even   if   I   am   mistaken   in   this   point   (and   I   probably   am),   the   basic  
argument  is  always  the  same.  
4) Prosodic  domains:  prosodic  domains  are  seen  in  non-­‐‑generativist  theories  
(like  David  Brazil’s  1997)  as  tone  units,  delimited  by  the  occurrence  of  all  
the  features  of  intonation  (pitch  level,  pitch  movement  and  prominence).  
Although  these  theories  fail  to  provide  an  explanation  of  the  phenomena  
involved   and   are   of   no   scientific   interest   since   they   are   actually  
unrestricted   theories   (there   is   no   possible   “malformation”,   but   every  
unexpected   choice   is   regarded   as   an   “exploitation   of   the   system”  
according   to   the   speaker’s   intentions),   the   door   is   certainly   open   for  
alternatives.  Chomsky  has   said   that  CPs  and  v*Ps   are  both  of   semantic  
and  phonological  relative  independency,  but  that  is  not  clear  at  all,  either  
from   the   explanatory   point   of   view   (why   those   projections   and   not  
others?)  or  from  the  descriptive  point  of  view  (a  tone  unit  can  ignore  an  
allegedly  phase  boundary,  as  in  /P  i  WANT  them  to  GO/,  where  the  v*P  
phase  does  not  constitute  a  tone  unit  in  its  own  right).  
5) Argument   structure:   I   have   not   much   to   add   to   what   I   have   said   in  
Krivochen  (2010c),  but  I  can  raise  the  bet  by  saying  that  there  is  no  such  
concept   as   A-­‐‑structure,   since   it   would   constitute   an   unprincipled  
complication  of  the  theory.  Let  us  assume  that  the  architecture  outlined  
in  Krivochen  (2010b)  is  on  the  right  track.  If  that  is  so,  then  we  start  from  
a   RSS   built   with   radically   underspecified   generic   concepts   obeying   the  
intention  of   the   relevant  mind10,   and   following   the  conservation  principle  
(see   below)   all   the   way   through   the   derivation   in   all   relevant   levels,  
instantiating   the   information   in   such   a  way   that   it   can   be   read   by   the  
level   in  question,  but   information  cannot  be   lost   in  the  process.  A  radically  
minimalist   theory,  with  a   stronger  componential   character   than  Hale  &  
Keyser’s   can   thus   dispense   with   the   concept   of   argument   structure,   whose  
encoding   terms   (a   feature?   A   structural   template?)   represent   a   serious  
                                                                                                 
10  This   “intention”   is   something   yet  mysterious,   since,   as   it   is   pre-­‐‑linguistic,   it  
should  be  formulated  in  non-­‐‑linguistic  terms,  with  which  one  would  be  admitting  that  
there   is   thought   without   language   –but   not   without   Merge-­‐‑,   quite   a   strong   claim.  
Bernárdez   (1982)  has  used   the   term  “global  plan”   to   refer   to   this  kind  of   intention,   a  
purely   pragmatic   object   after   which   semantics   and   syntax   are   shaped.   I   will   not   go  
deeper  into  this  in  this  paper,  but  leave  it  to  future  research.  
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problem.   All   we   have   is   a   bare   phrase   structure   and   an   explicature  
constructed  with  the  information  provided  by  the  syntax.  
6) Incorporation:   this  process  remains  quite  unclear,  especially  after  Hale  &  
Kayser’s  (2002)  analysis  of  conflation  as  a  distinct  operation.  According  to  
their  characterization,  incorporation  is  a  movement  operation  that  depends  
on   government,   and   thus   incorporation   from   a   Spec-­‐‑   to   the   immediate  
governing  head   is  possible.   Incorporation   leaves   a   trace   /copy,   and   the  
relations  must  obey  the  ECP  (and  so  on).  In  a  radically  minimalist  theory,  
there  is  no  place  for  these  kinds  of  processes,  which  rely  on  a  stipulative  
relation  (government,  in  this  case).  Conflation,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  a  
movement  operation,  but  it  is  concomitant  of  Merge.  It  involves  only  the  
copying  of  the  p-­‐‑signature  of  the  strict  complement  of  a  given  head  when  
this   head   is   phonologically   defective   (i.e.,   an   affix   or   null).   However,  
even  Hale  &  Keyser  resort  to  labels  in  their  account,  as  Merge  (according  
to  them)  creates  labels  given  the  fact  that  “the  label  of  a  syntactic  object  X  is  
the   feature   set   [F,H],   where   [F,H]   is   the   entire   complement   of   phonological,  
morphological,   syntactic   and   semantic   features   of  H,   the   head   of  X”   (Hale  &  
Kayser,   2002).   Their   label   identification   rule   is   not   as   arbitrary   as  
Chomsky’s,  but  it  is  equally  dispensable  in  my  model.  If  conflation  is  an  
operation   on   p-­‐‑signatures   (therefore,   a   PF   operation,   since   a  
phonologically  defective  node  represents  no  problem  to  syntax),  there  is  
no  conceptual  need  to  resort  to  labels  at  all.  
7) Endocentricity:   even   though   labeling   is   the   way   of   signaling  
endocentricity,  and  here  we  agree  with  Gallego,   I  have  said  that  syntax  
does   not   care   about   endocentricity   (it   is   an   “epiphenomenon”,   as  
Chomsky  says),  and  labels  are  not  relevant  to  syntax  either  (but  to  the  C-­‐‑
I   component),   so   there   is   no   much   left   to   be   said   at   this   point   of   the  
argumentation.  
8) Adjuncts  vs.  Complements:   the   first  question  to  be  addressed  would  be   if  
the  asymmetry  actually  exists,  and,  if  it  does,  in  what  terms  (for  example,  
minimally   required   vs.   not   minimally   required,   which   has   been   the  
traditional  opposition).  The  theory  of  adjunction  is   intimately  related  to  
the  concept  of  A-­‐‑structure,  so   its  current  status   is   totally  unclear   to  me.  
All   I   can   say   as   a   provisional   answer   to   the   problem   is   that   all   the  
information  that  we  find  in  the  explicature  level  (predicates,  arguments,  
“adjuncts”,   etc)   is   already   present   from   the   very   beginning   of   the  
process,   due   to   the   conservation   principle.   Information   is   neither   created  
nor  destroyed   (or   erased),   but   only   transformed,   as  we  will   see   below.  
Besides,   if  we  are  working  with  radically  bare  structure,   in  which  there  
are   no   heads   in   the   syntax,   there   is   no   point   in   talking   about   a  
Complement-­‐‑Adjunct   distinction,   since   all   we   have   is   Free   Merge,   all  
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other   fine-­‐‑graded   differences   being   made   in   the   explicature-­‐‑building  
process.  The  “adjunction”  structure  with  an  unergative  verb  presented  in  
Gallego   (2010:   27),   where   the   “main   clause”   is   the   figure   and   the  
“adjunct”  is  the  ground,  is  an  option  that  is  worth  considering,  although  
it  works  only  in  a  very  limited  number  of  cases,  namely,  those  in  which  
there   is   a   spatial   relation   involved.   Logical   relations,   subspecified  
additive   items   (coordinations   that   really  work   as   subordinations   in   the  
semantic  level)  and  other  types  of  so-­‐‑called  “adjuncts”  are  not  so  easy  to  
represent.  Gallego’s  representation  is  as  follows  (adapted  to  RSS  terms):  
(11)   
  
1.1.1.  Monotonic  Merge  and  Generalized  Transformations  
At  this  point,  once  I  have  presented  my  theory  of  Merge,  I  must  address  
a   problem   that  was   first   expressed   in  minimalist   terms   by  Uriagereka   (1999),  
namely,  monotonic  merge  and  parallel  derivations.  He  speaks  of  monotonic  merge  
when  we  apply  the  operation  successively,  forming  what  he  calls  a  “command  
unit”,  such  as  (17)  below:  
(12)     
  
Here,   we   have   no   points   of   symmetry   (i.e.,   symmetric   c-­‐‑command  
between   two   terminal   nodes),   so   this   structure   can   be   linearized   by   LCA.  
However,  for  this  system  to  work  optimally,  we  must  accept  two  conditions:  
a) β  must  not  be  complex  
b) γ  (or  the  rightmost  terminal  in  the  structure)  must  be  phonologically  
null,  like  a  trace.    
The   second   condition   is   the  most   difficult   to   solve,   and   no   satisfactory  
answer  has  been  given  to  it  that  we  know  of.  Therefore,  I  will  address  (a),  as  it  is  
22 
 
is that all the information that we find in the explicature level (predicates, 
DUJXPHQWV³DGMXQFWV´HWFLVDOUHDG\SUHVHQWIURPWKHYHU\beginning of the 
process, due to the conservation principle. Information is neither created nor 
destroyed (or erased), but only transformed, as we will see below. Besides, if we are 
working with radically bare structure, in which there are no heads in the syntax, 
there is no point in talking about a Complement-Adjunct distinction, since all we 
have is Free Merge, all other fine-graded differences being made in the explicature-
building process. The ³adjunction´ structure with an unergative verb presented in 
Gallego (2010: 27)ZKHUHWKH³PDLQFODXVH´LVWKHf igure DQGWKH³DGMXQFW´LVWKH
ground, is an option that is worth considering, although it works only in a very 
limited number of cases, namely, those in which there is a spatial relation involved. 
Logical relations, subspecified additive items (coordinations that really work as 
subordinations in the semantic evel) and other types of so-FDOOHG³ cts´ are not 









2.4.1 Monotonic Merge and Generalized Transformations: 
 
At this point, once we have presented our theory of Merge, we must address a problem that 
was first expressed in minimalist terms by Uriagereka (1999), namely, monotonic merge 
and parallel derivations. We speak of monotonic merge when we apply the operation 





[AT]   
in 









Here, we have no points of symmetry (i.e., symmetric c-command between two terminal 
nod s), so this structure can be lin arized by LCA. However, for this system to work 






The second condition is the most difficult to solv , and no satisfactory answer has been 
given to it that we know of. Therefore, we will address (a), as it is not certain that (b) holds 










                                                   
12 If there is no movement, then we must assume that a null node is inserted there, à la De Belder & Van 
Craenenbroeck (2011). We believe that such a theoretical resource only complicates the system substantively, 
and we will therefore dismiss this kind of solutions unless they prove not only inevitable but also optimal. At 
this point, we do not even assume LCA as correct, which is an obvious move if one takes into account that we 
are trying to de-construct minimalism in order to keep only what is conceptually necessary and what can be 
proven principled (i.e., interface-required).  
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not   certain   that   (b)   holds   under   Radical   Minimalism11  whereas   (a)   directly  
concerns  my  theory  of  Merge.  
If   β   is   complex,   this   is,   {β,   {β,   η}},   then   there  would   be   symmetrical   c-­‐‑
command  between  β  and  α  in  the  following  configuration:  
(13)     
  
There  we  have  two  command  units,  each  assembled  by  monotonic  merge  
simultaneously   in   separate   derivational   spaces   (or   sequentially   in   the   same  
derivational   space,   an   option   that   seems   to   have  more   biological   plausibility,  
see  Krivochen  2010d).  So  far,  so  good.  The  problem  is  that  the  system  has  to  be  
able  to  merge  complex  units,  whole  trees.12  I  have  said,  following  Boeckx  (2010)  
that  Merge   is   actually  Merge   α,   a   free   unbounded   operation   that  merges   two  
objects   that   share   format.  Now,   I  would   like   to  go  deeper   into   that.  We  must  
distinguish  two  kinds  of  formats:  
a) Ontological  format  
b) Structural  format  
Ontological   format   refers   to   the   nature   of   the   entities   involved.   For  
example,  Merge  can  apply  (“ergatively”,  as  nobody  /  nothing  “applies  Merge”  
agentively)   conceptual   addresses   (i.e.,   roots)   because   they   are   all   linguistic  
instantiations  of  generic  concepts.  With  ontological  format  I  want  to  acknowledge  
the   fact   that   a   root   and   a   generic   concept   cannot   merge,   for   example.   It   is  
specially  useful  if  we  want  to  explain  in  simple  terms  why  Merge  cannot  apply  
cross-­‐‑modularly:   ontological   format   is   part   of   the   legibility   conditions   of  
                                                                                                 
11  If   there   is   no  movement,   then  we  must   assume   that   a   null   node   is   inserted  
there,   à   la   De   Belder   &   Van   Craenenbroeck   (2011).   I   believe   that   such   a   theoretical  
resource  only  complicates  the  system  substantively,  and  we  will  therefore  dismiss  this  
kind  of  solutions  unless  they  prove  not  only  inevitable  but  also  optimal.  At  this  point,  I  
do  not  even  assume  LCA  as  correct,  which  is  an  obvious  move  if  one  takes  into  account  
that   we   are   trying   to   de-­‐‑construct   minimalism   in   order   to   keep   only   what   is  
conceptually  necessary  and  what  can  be  proven  principled  (i.e.,  interface-­‐‑required).    
12  I   am  not  making   reference   to  Specs-­‐‑  and  Adjuncts,   since   those  notions  have  
no  place   in  my  theory,  but   I  am  mainly   thinking  about  Distributed  Morphology  and,  
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individual  modules.  Both  roots  and  procedural  nodes  convey  (interpretable,   if  
the   note   is   needed)   semantic   information.   As   “bundles”   of   dimensions,   they  
have  the  same  ontology.  The  conceptual  /  procedural  character  is  determined  in  
the   interpretative   interface,   it   is   of   no   relevance   to   syntax,   which   is   purely  
generative.   Free   combination   is   thus   possible.   Any   other   option   has   to   be  
explained  and  justified  in  principled  terms.  
Structural  format,  on  the  other  hand,  refers  to  the  way  in  which  elements  
are  organized.   If  what   I  have  said  so   far   is  correct,   then  only  binary-­‐‑branched  
hierarchical   structures   are   allowed   in   human   mind.   The   arguments   are  
conceptual   rather   than   empirical,   and   I   have   already   reviewed   them:   Merge  
optimally  operates  with  the  smallest  non-­‐‑trivial  number  of  objects.  Needless  to  
say,  given  the  fact  that  ontological  format  is  a  necessary  condition  for  Merge  to  apply  
(principled   because   of   interface   conditions,   whatever   module   we   want   to  
consider),   the   resultant   structures   will   always   consist   on   formally   identical  
objects.13  Taking   all   this   into   account,   I   complete   Boeckx’s   characterization   of  
Merge  and  say   that  Merge   is  a  conceptually  necessary  operation  that  applies  to  the  
smallest  number  of  elements  sharing  (ontological  or  structural)  format.  
Given  this  characterization,   I  have  a  straightforward  way  of  accounting  
for   “generalized   transformations”,   a   recently   resurrected   operation   from   the  
very  early  stages  of  Generative  Grammar.  From  my  point  of  view,  a  generalized  
transformation  is  nothing  more  than  Merge  applied  to  structurally  identical  objects.  
The  difference  between  “monotonic  Merge”  and  “Generalized  transformations”  
is  the  format  that  is  relevant:  ontological  format   is  relevant  to  monotonic  merge,  
whereas  structural  format  is  relevant  to  generalized  transformations.  
Let  us  review  what  has  been  said  so  far,  in  a  very  schematic  way:  
Possibilities  for  Merge:  
i. Merge  (α,  β),  α  ≠  β  –but  α  and  β  share  ontological  or  structural  
format-­‐‑  Distinct  binary  Merge  (Boeckx,  2010)  
ii. Merge  (α,  β),  α  =  β  Self  Merge  (Adger,  2011)  
iii. Merge  (α,  β,  γ…),  α  ≠  β  ≠  γ  Unrestricted  distinct  Merge  
Let  us  consider  the  following:  
(14)   NS  Merge  (α,  β,  γ)  =  {α,  β,  γ}  
In   the  Narrow   Syntax,   everything  would   be   fine,   since  Merge   is   blind  
and   NS   is   not   an   interpretative   component.   But,   in   the   interface,   problems  
                                                                                                 
13  This   is   not   trivial   if   the   reader   is   thinking   about   the   possibility   of  merging  
structurally   identical   elements   from   different   modules   (which   is   obviously  
undesirable).  
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would  arise.  Let  us  assume  that  α  =  √  and  β  and  γ  are  procedural  categories,  say,  
D  and  T  respectively.  
(15)   C-­‐‑I2  Label  {√,  D,  T}  =  ??  
Having  two  procedural  categories  results  in  crash  at  the  explicature  level,  
there   is  no  way  of   labeling  a  structure  where   two  elements  could  “guide”   the  
interpretation   in   different   directions.   The   same   happens   if   the   numbers   are  
changed,  say,  two  roots  and  one  procedural  category:  even  if  we  think  that  one  
root   may   be   “categorized”   (which   is   not   a   viable   option   at   all   from   our  
perspective),   there   would   still   be   an   uninterpretable   element,   namely,   an  
uncategorized   root,   uninterpretable   in   LF   because   of   semantic  
underspecification.  Binary-­‐‑distinct  Merge,  then,  is  interface-­‐‑required,  no  special  
conditions   imposed  over  Merge   itself.   In  any  of   the  cases,   it  must  be  said,   the  
application   of   Merge   involving   Ø   (e.g.,   {α,   Ø})   is   equal   to   Self-­‐‑Merge   for  
interface  purposes,  thus  being  rejected  in  my  proposal.  
2.5  A  note  on  Collins  (2002)  
Collins  also  attempted  to  eliminate  labels  as  they  were  conceived  of  and  
make   use   of   label-­‐‑free   trees   like  my   (11)   above,   doing   away  with  Chomsky’s  
labeling  algorithm.  No  operation  can  make  reference  to  “maximal  projections”  
or   “intermediate   projections”,   since   those   terms   only   have   sense   within  
traditional   X-­‐‑bar   theory.   Collins’   argument   is   that,   even   though   lexical  
categories  may  have  “categorial  labels”  like  N,  V,  A,  P,  those  categorial  features  
do   not   project,   and   therefore,   there   are   no   VPs,   NPs   or   anything   like   it.   He  
focuses  on  four  areas  on  which  labels  are  apparently  used:  
• X-­‐‑bar  Theory  
• Selection  (in  terms  of  subcategorization)  
• Minimal  Link  Condition  
• PF  interface  
According  to  him,  all  reference  to  labels  can  be  dispensed  with  if  we  take  
into   account   four   “syntactic   relations”   that   can   hold   between   lexical   items,  
malformations  being  mainly  a  matter  of  Minimality:  
• Theta  (X,  Y):  X  assigns  a  theta  role  to  Y  
• EPP  (X,  Y):  X  satisfies  the  EPP  feature  of  Y  
• Agree  (X,  Y):  X  matches  Y,  and  Y  values  X  
• Subcat  (X,  Y):  X  subcategorizes  for  Y  
Even  though  I  agree  with  his  intention,  I  must  say  that  Collins’  solution  
does   not   seem   right   to   me.   His   model   can   be   proved   wrong   if   one   can  
demonstrate  that  those  operations  either  do  not  exist  or  are  not  syntactic.  Theta  
roles   have   been   deeply   analyzed   in   Krivochen   (2010c)   they   are   semantic  
functions   that   are   read   in   the   explicature   level   from   the   information   that   the  
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syntax  provides:  case,   structural  position   (both   in  RSS  and  “narrow  syntactic”  
representation)   and   materialization.   There   is   no   such   thing   as   theta   role  
assignment  in  the  syntax  (or  theta  features,  as  Hornstein  (2003)  suggests),  since  
they  are  not  relevant  to  syntactic  computations,  but  only  to  the  construction  of  the  
explicature,  a  full  propositional  form.  
As  regards  EPP,  it  has  been  eliminated  in  various  ways.  Some  take  it  as  
an   inherited   version   of   C´s   [EF]   in   T,   but   I   think   that   that   is   quite   a   circular  
argument,  since  EF  is  as  stipulative  as  the  EPP.  I  prefer  to  stick  to  the  idea  that  
Spec-­‐‑TP  is  a  position  that  conveys  only  “themeness”  in  informative  terms,  given  
that  structural  position  is  meaningful  in  the  explicature  level.  If  this  is  so,  then  
those  nominal  expressions  that  are  themes  will  rise  to  that  position,  which  is,  as  I  
argued  in  Krivochen  (2011),  semantically  transparent,  as  no  particular  inference  is  
related  to  it.    
I  have  already  dispensed  with  Agree  as  an  operation,  resorting  instead  to  
licensing   (see   Krivochen,   2010c   and   the   discussion   below).   Dimensions   are  
licensed   in   an   element   only   if   it   is   in   a   local   relation   with   an   appropriate  
procedural/functional   head.   That   local   relation   can   be   described   in   terms   of  
phasehood  or  Minimal  Configuration  (Rizzi,  2004),  where  H  and  XP  are  in  an  MC  
only   if   there   is   no   “potential   governor”   between   H   and   XP.   My   theory   of  
quantum   dimensions   attempts   to   simplify   the   whole   agreement   system,   so   I  
will  leave  the  topic  for  the  time  being.  
Subcategorization   is   the  most  difficult  element   to   justify   in  a   (radically)  
minimalist   framework,   since   it  has   to  be  encoded   in  a   feature  which  not  only  
will   add   complexity   to   the   representation   but   also   impose   a   stipulative  
restriction   on  Merge.   Merge   would   be   an   operation   quite   analogous   to   GB’s  
satisfy,   because   theories   with   subcategorization   frames   are   strongly  
constructivist,   and   their   aim   is   to  generate  only   legible   structures  by   imposing  
constraints  to  the  phrase  formation  operations.  
I  have  thus  analyzed  different  views  on  the  labeling  process,  and  tried  to  
prove   that   there   is   no   algorithm   whatsoever   to   resort   to   in   a   radically  
minimalist   framework,   only   the   dynamics   of   unbounded   Merge   and   the  
interface  conditions.  
2.  Agree  and  Transfer  
Transfer  is  the  operation  that  takes  a  given  piece  of  information  and  sends  
it  to  another  module  or  faculty.  The  transfer  to  the  A-­‐‑P/  SM  component  is  what  
used   to   be   called   Spell-­‐‑Out,   or   vocabulary   insertion   in   a   DM   framework.   In   a  
massively  modular  mind,  Transfer  is  essential  in  the  interaction  between  modules.  
In  Krivochen   (2010d)  we   have   differentiated   transfer   from   transduction,   taking  
the   former   to   be   the   transmission   of   legible   information   from   one  module   to  
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another,   and   the   latter   to   be   the   translation   of   information   coming   from   the  
phenomenological  world  to  a  given  vertical  faculty,  in  Fodor’s  terms.  In  that  paper  I  
also   said   that   as   soon   as   a   fully   interpretable   object   (in   terms   of   the   interface  
levels,  whatever  these  are)   is  assembled  in  a  given  level,   it   is   transferred,  thus  
leading  us  to  a  non-­‐‑stipulative  definition  of  phase:  
(16)   P  is  a  phase  in  LX  (a  given  module  or  level)  iff  it  is  the  minimal  term  fully  interpretable  in  
LX+1  (i.e.,  the  module  it  has  to  present  information  to)      
This   definition   is   dynamic   and   presupposes   a   strongly   componential  
architecture,  in  which  the  components  can  “peer  into”  the  transferring  module  
to  see  if  a  fully  interpretable  structure  has  been  assembled.  No  look  back  problem  
arises,  since  I  do  not  have  a  module  looking  into  its  own  past  derivational  steps,  
but  a  module  X  (LX+1   in  our  definition)  analyzing  structured  objects  assembled  
in  module  Y  (LX)  according  to  its  own  legibility  conditions.  Information  is  taken  
to   be   carried   in   the   form   of   features   (Chomsky,   1995),   be   them  phonological,  
semantic  or  syntactic.  These   features  are,  according   to  Uriagereka’s  definition,  
“valued   dimensions”   of   the   form   [+/-­‐‑  D],   being  D   a   given   dimension   and   two  
possible  values,  +  and  -­‐‑.  That  is  the  canonical  representation  of  features  and  the  
one   we   will   use   for   the   purposes   of   the   present   discussion14.   Within   the  
Minimalist   framework,   features  were   fundamentally  divided   (Chomsky,  1995)  
in   interpretable   and   uninterpretable   on   the   one   hand   and   valued   and   unvalued  
(when  entering  the  derivation)  on  the  other.  A  feature  was  not  (un)interpretable  
per   se,   but   depending   on   the   category   it   was   part   of15.   The   logics   were   the  
following:  if  a  feature  F  makes  a  semantic  contribution  in  a  LI,  it  is  interpretable  in  
that   LI.   Thus,   [φ-­‐‑features]   were   uninterpretable   in   T,   but   interpretable   in  
nominals   since   [person   /   number   /   gender]   are   (allegedly)   semantically  
interpretable   in  DPs,  and   it   is   the  verb   that  agrees  with   the  noun,  and  not   the  
other   way   around.   Of   course   that   reasoning   is   wrong,   since   (a)   there   is   no  
definition  of  “semantic  contribution”,  and  (b)  if  by  “semantic  contribution”  we  
take  “contribution  to  the  explicature”  (decoding  and  referent  assignment),  we  are  
in   serious   trouble   since   φ-­‐‑features   in   nominals,   for   example,   are   sometimes  
tricky,  like  in  the  case  of  pluralia  tantum.  Realizing  this  mistake,  Chomsky  (1999)  
changes  the  angle  and  entertains  the  idea  that  uninterpretable  features  enter  the  
derivation   unvalued   from   the   lexicon.   In   his   view,   syntax   only   cares   about  
                                                                                                 
14  For  details,  see  Adger  (2008)  and  Adger  &  Sevenoius  (2010).  
15  We  must  now  address  a  reviewer’s  comment:  “(…)  in  fact  Case  was/is  precisely  
such   a   feature,   i.e.   one  with   no   interpretable   counterpart   (…)”.   This   is   actually   a   point   in  
favor  of  our  proposal:  if  a  feature  has  no  interpretable  counterpart  (within  the  theory),  
then  why  positing  it  at  all?  Uninterpretability  makes  sense  (if  it  does)  only  if  there  is  a  
concomitant   notion   of   interpretability.   If   a   feature   has   no   interpretable   counterpart,  
then,  it  is  not  “uninterpretable”,  just  superfluous.    
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valuation,   not   interpretability.   However,   we   also   find   problems   with   this  
proposal.  To  begin  with,   the  stipulative  character  of   the  assignment  of  valued  
and   unvalued   features   to   different   categories   is   maintained.   Besides,   it   is   a  
clearly  syntacticocentric  solution,  with  no  attention  drawn  to  the  interface  levels  
and  interpretability  in  the  external  systems.  Unvalued  features  must  be  valued  
by  agree  between  a  probe  and  a  goal  in  order  to  assure  convergence.  Once  valued,  
the  uninterpretable  features  are  eliminated,  by  means  of  erasure.   Interpretable  
information,   on   the   other   hand,   is   conserved,   since   it   makes   a   “semantic  
contribution”,   whatever   that   means.   Lasnik,   Uriagereka   &   Boeckx   (2005)  
borrow  Conservation  Principle  from  physics,  and  state  the  following  law:  
(17) 1st  Conservation  Law  (Lasnik,  Uriagereka  &  Boeckx’s  version):  
All  information  in  a  syntactic  derivation  comes  from  the  lexicon  and  interpretable  
lexical  information  cannot  be  destroyed.  
The   problem   with   this   law   is   that   it   makes   use   of   lexical   information  
taken   from   a   pre-­‐‑syntactic   and   monolithic   lexicon,   which   is   the   norm   in  
orthodox   Minimalism,   but   with   which   we   will   not   work.   However,   keep   in  
mind   the   spirit   of   the   principle,   since   I  will   try   to   “recycle”   it   later.   They   go  
further   away,   positing   a   second   conservation   rule,   applying   to   interpretable  
structures16:  
(18) 2nd  Conservation  Law:  
Interpretable  structural  units  created  in  a  syntactic  derivation  cannot  be  altered.  
Given   our   definition   of   phase,  we   can   understand   what   they   mean   by  
“interpretable   structural   units”,   in   fact,   one   could   easily   replace   that   in   our  
definition  without  any  significant  loss  of  meaning.  But  we  will  try  to  introduce  
a  radical  change  in  the  way  derivations  are  seen.  For  that  purpose,  we  modify  a  
bit  the  conservation  laws  to  fit  our  presentational  purposes:  
(19) Conservation  Principle  (first,  our  formulation):  
a) Interpretable  information  cannot  be  eliminated,  it  must  go  all-­‐‑the-­‐‑way  through  the  
derivation  
b) Uninterpretable  information  is  “viral”  to  the  system  and  must  thus  be  eliminated  by  
Agree  
In  this  formulation  I  expect  to  be  covering  and  summarizing  the  meaning  
that   both   Chomsky   and   Lasnik   et.   al.   wanted   to   convey   (“viral”   theory   of  
uninterpretable  features  is  Uriagereka’s).  
After  having  presented  all  this  information,  there  is  still  a  basic  question  
to   be   addressed:   what   is   really   the   difference   between   interpretable   and  
                                                                                                 
16  This  principle  is  reminiscent  of  Edmond’s  Structure  Preserving  Hypothesis,  but  
the  mention  of  interpretability  gives  it  a  more  “minimalist  flavor”.  
  ©  Iberia:  An  International  Journal  of  Theoretical  Linguistics   vol  3.2,  2011,  20-­‐‑62  
http://www.siff.us.es/iberia/index.php/ij/index   ISSN  1989-­‐‑8525  
44   An  introduction  to  Radical  Minimalism  I  
uninterpretable   features?  Or,   to  be  a  bit  more   radical:   are   there  uninterpretable  
features  at  all?  Notice  that  the  difference  between  interpretable-­‐‑uninterpretable,  
although  subsumed   to   that  between  valued  and  unvalued,   is   still   there  at   the  
very   core   of   the   theory,   and   is   taken   as   a   primitive,   with   no   explanation  
whatsoever.   If   syntax  only   cares  about  putting   things   together,  why  should   it  
bother  about  valuation  and  so  on?  After  all,   feature  valuation  is  an  operation  that  
only   makes   sense   taking   convergence   at   the   interface   levels   into   account,   but   in   the  
syntax   proper   (or   “narrow   syntax”)   it   is   perfectly   superfluous,   since   nothing  
“converges”  or  “crashes”  in  the  syntax.  
What   we   propose   regarding   all   so-­‐‑called   "ʺuninterpretable   features"ʺ   is  
that   they   do   not   exist   at   all,   especially   considering   the   proposal   made   in  
Chomsky  (1999)  that  uninterpretability  is  concomitant  to  unvaluation.  That  would  
be  the  strong  (and  optimal)  thesis.  Instead  of  a  number  of  features  (number  that  
has   increased   over   the   years)  which   enter   the   derivation   valued   or   unvalued  
depending   on   the   category   they   compose,   we   have   a   minimal   number   of  
quantum  dimensions  conveying  semantic   (conceptual  or  procedural)  meaning,  
which   adopt  one  value  or   another   in   a   local   relation  with   a  proper  procedural  
head,   namely,   a  Minimal   Configuration   (Rizzi,   2004).   Let   us   analyze   what   we  
mean  by  quantum  dimensions.  Chomsky’s  feature  valuation  process  needs:  
a) A  probe,  an  unvalued  dimension  in  a  (functional)  head  
b) A  goal,  the  same  dimension  but  valued  in  a  c-­‐‑commanded  head17  
We  see  a  redundancy  here,  since  we  will  depart  from  the  claim  that  there  
is  no  need  for  the  same  dimension  to  be  in  two  heads  just  for  the  sake  of  feature  
valuation,   the   arguments   in   favor   of   these   operations   become   cyclical18.   My  
argument  seeks  to  eliminate  Agree  both  as  a  relation  and  as  an  operation.  If  the  
system   is   really   “free”,   as   Boeckx   (2010)   claims,   then   there   cannot   be   any  
“Agree”  operation  as  currently  formulated  since  it  would  imply  a  complication  
for   the   theory   and   a   restriction   for   the   possible   relations   between   elements  
(namely,  relations  are  limited  to  those  between  probe  and  goal).  A  constructivist  
theory  needs  Agree   in  order   to  establish   the  “right”   (i.e.,   convergent)   relations  
between   elements,   but   in   our   theory,   based   on   licensing,   such   a   restriction   is  
                                                                                                 
17  The  relation  is  always  head-­‐‑head,  even  if  we  say  that  T  matches  features  with  
a   DP,   it   is   really   matching   features   with   D,   and   all   subsequent   operations   (e.g.,  
movement)  apply  to  the  smallest  term  that  assures  convergence,  namely,  the  whole  DP.  
18  If   we   take   an   architecture   like   the   one   outlined   in   Krivochen   (2010b),   we  
would  first  have  a  “fully  interpretable”  RSS  and  then  we  would  add  (un-­‐‑interpretable)  
features   that  would  be   later   on  valuated  by  Agree   and   erased   from   the   computation  
(see  Epstein  &  Seeley,   2002,   for   a  discussion  on   this   specific   point).   That   is,   for  us,   a  
redundant   (and   stipulative)   computation,   and   plainly   inadmissible   in   a   Radically  
Minimalist  theory.  
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regarded   as   stipulative.   I   aim   at   dispensing   with   the   need   of   having   a  
dimension  [D]  in  two  places  at  the  same  time  (in  one  of  which  it  often  makes  no  
semantic  contribution)   just   for   the  sake  of  Agree,  and  having  Agree   just   for   the  
sake  of  eliminating  uninterpretable  versions  of   [D].  This   is,  having  an  [u-­‐‑T]   in  
D,  for  example,  is  absolutely  superfluous,  and  this  will  be  obvious  in  our  more  
radical   theory,   to   be   introduced   further   below.   This   circularity   is   to   be  
eliminated  in  Radical  Minimalism,  where  the  procedural  instructions  conveyed  
by  a  terminal  node  in  a  local  relation  with  a  structure  license  an  interpretation  
in  LF  without  the  need  of  positing  extra  elements.  
My  claim  here  will  be  that  language  is  part  of  the  natural  world,  and  as  
such,  it  is  a  system  whose  physical  properties  are  the  same  as  any  other  system.  
I  will  invoke  here  Heisemberg’s  (1927)  uncertainty  principle,  which  can  be  better  
explained  from  an  example:  
Imagine  we  have  an  electron  in  a  tridimensional  space,  and  we  want  to  
know  its  location.  In  order  to  do  so,  we  need  to  see  it,  projecting  some  kind  of  
light  on  it.  This  light  is  projected  in  the  form  of  a  photon,  a  particle  with  mass.  
The   “problem”   is   that   when   the   photon   crashes   with   the   electron,   there   is   a  
change  in  the  original  location,  which  remains  unknown.  That  original  location  
(I  have  taken  this  magnitude  just  for  the  sake  of  the  example,  but  I  could  have  
also  worked  with   speed   or   trajectory)   is   taken   to   be   a   “superposition”   of   all  
possible   locations,   expressed   in   the   form   of   a   “wave   function”   (in   de   Broglie’s  
terms).   Therefore,   there   will   always   be   a   magnitude   whose   real   value   will  
remain  unknown   to  us.   In   this  kind  of  physical   systems,   it   is   the  observation  
that   makes   the   relevant   dimension   collapse   to   one   of   the   possible   states19.  
Uncertainty   is   a   natural   characteristic   of   physical   systems,   and   by   no   means   an  
instrumental   problem,   taking  physical   system   in   its   technical   sense,   that   is,   any  
portion   of   the   physical   universe   chosen   for   analysis.   We   take   “physical  
universe”  to  be  equivalent  to  “natural  world”,  and  we  will  use  one  or  the  other  
indistinctly.  Magnitudes  (or  dimensions,  to  maintain  a  term  more  closely  related  
to   linguistics,   since   we   are   not   dealing   with   measurable   elements)   are   not  
necessarily  binary;  what  is  more,   in  abstracto  they  can  comprise  as  many  states  
as  the  system  requires,  which,  as  I  will  show  later,  leads  us  to  a  much  simpler  
form  of  minimalism.  I  will  express  it  by  using  this  notation:  for  any  dimension  
D,  [DX]  expresses  its  quantum  state.      
Let  us  suppose  that  we  have  a  physical  system  which  starts  out  in  a  state  
α,  and  changes,  over  some  time,   into  state  α’.  Of  course,   it  could  have  started  
out   in   any   of   many   different   states.   So   suppose   it   starts   out   in   state   β,   and  
                                                                                                 
19  See,   for   example,   the   well-­‐‑known   EPR   (Einstein-­‐‑Podolsky-­‐‑Rosen)   paradox,  
which  inspired  Schrödinger  (1935)  paper.  
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changes   over   the   same   considered   time   interval   into   state   β’.   We   can  
schematically  represent  these  two  possible  “trajectories”  like  this:  
(20)   α      →        α’  
(21)   β      →        β’  
Since  α  and  β  are  possible  states  of  the  system,  so  is  their  arbitrary  linear  
combination  aα  +  bβ.  What  Schrödinger’s  Equation   (SE)   tells   us   is   that   given  
that  α  and  β  would  change  in  the  ways  just  indicated,  their  linear  combination  
must  also  change  in  the  following  way:  
(22)   aα  +  bβ    →    aα’  +  bβ’.  
The  interesting  fact  about  the  above  mentioned  equations  is  that  they  hold  
only  if  no  “measurement”  is  taking  place.  
If  a  “measurement”  (say,  mere  observation)  is  taking  place  then  we  must  
consider  an  entirely  different  story  about  how  the  state  of  the  system  changes:  
during  the  measurement,  the  system  S  must  “collapse”  into  a  state  that  is  certain  
to   produce   the   observed   result   of   the   measurement.   The   hypothesis   is  
exemplified  by  Schrödinger  (1935)  using  the  now  famous  “cat  paradox”,  which  
deserves  to  be  quoted  in  full-­‐‑length:  
“A  cat   is  penned  up  in  a  steel  chamber,  along  with  the  following  device  (which  
must  be  secured  against  direct  interference  by  the  cat):  in  a  Geiger  counter  there  is  a  tiny  
bit  of   radioactive  substance,   so  small,   that  perhaps   in   the  course  of   the  hour  one  of   the  
atoms  decays,  but  also,  with  equal  probability,  perhaps  none;   if   it  happens,   the  counter  
tube  discharges   and   through  a   relay   releases   a  hammer  which   shatters   a   small   flask  of  
hydrocyanic  acid.   If  one  has   left   this   entire   system   to   itself   for  an  hour,  one  would   say  
that   the   cat   still   lives   if  meanwhile   no   atom   has   decayed.   The  ψ-­‐‑function   of   the   entire  
system  would  express  this  by  having  in  it  the  living  and  dead  cat  (pardon  the  expression)  
mixed   or   smeared   out   in   equal   parts.   It   is   typical   of   these   cases   that   an   uncertainty  
originally   restricted   to   the   atomic   domain   becomes   transformed   into   macroscopic  
uncertainty,  which   can   then  be   resolved   by  direct   observation”.   (p.   7-­‐‑8.  Highlighted   in  
the  original)  
The  question  to  be  asked  now  is:  how  do  we  apply  this  to  language?  
Our   answer   will   be   the   following:   I   will   consider   language   to   be   a  
physical   system,   and   therefore,   if   SE  applies   to   any  physical   system,   it  must  
also  apply  to  language.  Of  course,  I  am  not  saying  that  language  shares  all  of  its  
features  with  other  systems  (since,  as  Boeckx  correctly  points  out,  we  may  have  
one   or   the   other   scattered   in   different   systems),   but   it   must   be   considered  
fundamentally  as  a  physical  system  if  we  take  seriously  the  idea  that  it  is  part  of  
the  natural  world,  as  Chomsky  has  explicitly  done  along  the  years.  We  must  say  
in  this  point  that,  despite  what  it  may  seem20,  there  is  no  reductionism  in  treating  
FL   as   a   physical   system   if   we   consider   that   a   physical   system   is   merely  
                                                                                                 
20  We   thank   Phoevos   Panagiotidis   (p.c.)   for   making   this   objection,   and   other  
valuable  comments  as  well.  
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the  portion  of  the  universe  taken  for  analysis.  If  we  consider  that  universe  to  be  the  
so-­‐‑called   "ʺnatural  world"ʺ,   then,  my   thesis   follows   naturally.  That   is,   I   am   not  
making   a  reduction   of   biology   to  physics,   but   simply   analyzing   a   biological  
phenomenon   in   physical   terms,   as   a   physical   system   (in   which   there   is   no  
contradiction   whatsoever)   and,   as   such,   applying   the   tools   that   have   been  
devised   in  physics   in   the  degree   that   it   is  possible,  and  without  confusing   the  
methodological   tools   with   substantive   elements.   Of   course,   looking   for   exact  
correlates  between  any  two  fields  would  be  irrational  in  the  substantive  level  (i.e,  
units  of  analysis,  as  Poppel  &  Embick,  2005  correctly  point  out),  but  I  put  forth  
that   the  methodological   level   has   much   to   tell   us,   as   we   are   all   working   with  
"ʺparcels"ʺ   of   the   same   Universe   that,   I   will   try   to   show,   are   identical   in   a  
principled  level  of  abstraction,  which  is  the  main  thesis  of  Radical  Minimalism.  
The  next  step  would  be  to  put  this  theory  in  practice.  Let  us  assume  the  
framework   outlined   so   far   and   the   following   quantum   dimension:   [CaseX].  
Following   the   idea   presented   in  Krivochen   (2010c),   this   dimension   comprises  
three  possible  “outcomes”:  NOM  sphere  (φ),  ACC  sphere  (θ)  and  DAT  sphere  
(λ).   All   three   are   possible   final   states   of   the   system,   and   therefore   the   linear  
combination   must   also   be   considered   a   legitimate   state   of   the   system.   The  
dimension  in  abstracto  could  then  be  expressed  as  follows,  using  SE:  
(23) Nφ  +  Aθ  +  Dλ  
As  I  have  said  before,  this  only  holds  if  no  “measurement”  takes  place,  in  
Schrödinger´s  terms.  We  will  not  speak  of  “measurement”,  since  Case  is  not  a  
magnitude,  but  I  will  consider  that  the  factor  that  makes  the  relevant  dimension  
collapse  is  the  merger  of  a  functional  /  procedural  node.  What  we  must  take  into  
account   is   that  not  only  do  we  have  DPs  with   [Case]   and   functional  heads   in  
interaction  in  the  computational  system,  but  the  output  (i.e,  the  resultant  state)  
must   also   converge   at   the   interface   levels,   so   our   problem   is   a   bit   more  
complicated.  As  usual,   I  will   focus   ourselves   in   the  C-­‐‑I   component.  What  we  
want   to   do   now   is   derive   the   relations   P-­‐‑DAT;   v-­‐‑ACC   and   T-­‐‑NOM   from  
interface  conditions,  apart  from  the  argumentation  we  have  made  in  Krivochen  
(2010c)   in   relation   with   θ-­‐‑roles   and   Case,   to   which   we   refer   the   reader.  
Anything  else  would  be  stipulative,  and  that  is  something  we  cannot  accept  in  
Radical  Minimalism.  
Epistemologically,  we  have   the   advantage   over   theoretical   physics   that  
we  have  observable  stretches  of   language  where  to  test  our  hypothesis.  So,   let  
us  take  a  ditransitive  Prepositional  Indirect  Object  Construction  (PIOC):  
(24) INOM  gave  a  bookACC  to  MaryDAT  
By  looking  at  the  same  construction  in  other  languages  with  rich  casual  
morphology  (like  Latin,  Sanskrit  or  Greek)   it  has  been  established  that  the  {D}  
[I]  has  Nominative  Case,  [the  book]  has  Accusative  Case  and  {P}  [to  Mary]  has  
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Dative  Case.  But  this  is  nothing  more  than  a  description,  with  no  explanation  as  
to  why   things   are   the  way   they   are.   I  will   not   review   the   classic   attempts   of  
explanation   (see   Chomsky,   1981,   1995,   among   others),   but   go   directly   to   our  
point.   The   (LF)   structural   configuration   for   (32)   is   the   following   (labeling  
according  to  interface  conditions,  as  said  above  –and  see  Krivochen,  2010b,  d-­‐‑,  
and  omitting  irrelevant  positions  /  projections):  
(25)   
  
The   weak   hypothesis   would   be   that   each   DP   will   bear   a   dimension  
[CaseX],  whose  value  when  entering  the  derivation  will  be  a  “ψ-­‐‑function”,  or  a  
complex  vector  [Nφ  +  Aθ  +  Dλ].  That  is,  the  quantum  dimension  will  comprise  
all  three  possible  values,  as  all  three  are  possible  states  of  the  Case  system  for  a  
particular   DP.   However,   [DX]   cannot   be   read   by   the   interface   levels,   so   the  
quantum  dimension  must  “collapse”  to  one  of  the  possible  states.  Here,  it  is  not  
“measurement”  but  Merge  that  does  the  work.  Let  us  take  the  {P}  structure  as  an  
example.   We   have   the   merger   of   {to[TO],   Mary[CaseX]}   -­‐‑and   the   subsequent  
“labeling”  of  the  structure  as  {P}  in  LF  for  C-­‐‑I  interpretability  at  the  explicature  
level,   since   in  a  dynamic  model   interface-­‐‑interpretation   is   in  real-­‐‑time-­‐‑.  At   this  
point  in  the  derivation,  we  are  already  in  condition  of  collapsing  the  quantum  
dimension  in  [Mary],  since  we  have  a  procedural  node  in  a  minimal  configuration  
that  can   license   that  dimension   in  an  XP   (adapting   the   idea   from  Rizzi,  2004).  
This   minimal   configuration   is   defined   in   our   terms   within   phase   boundaries,  
following   the   definition   given   above.   Since   the   procedural   information  
conveyed   by   P   is   essentially   locative,   the   quantum   case   dimension   on   [Mary]  
will  collapse  to  the   locative  sphere,  i.e.,  Dative.  The  licensing  takes  place  only  if  
there   is   no   closer   functional   /   procedural   head   that   can   license   the   relevant  
feature,   in   order   to   respect   Minimality.   Just   as   I   have   taken   SE   and  
Heisemberg’s  uncertainty  principle  from  quantum  mechanics,  I  will  also  draw  
another  principle,  this  time  from  field  theory  (Lasnik,  Uriagereka  &  Boeckx  quote  
this   principle   from   fluid   mechanics,   but   it   is   the   same   principle,   as   we   are  
37 
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always   dealing   with   physical   systems):   Locality.   Just   like   a   particle   cannot  
influence   any   other   than   its   surrounding   particles,   a   procedural   head   has   a  
certain  area  of   influence  where   it   can   license   features   if  necessary.  Remember  
that   there   is   no   checking   /   matching,   so   neither   greed   nor   “enlightened   self  
interest”  are   involved.   It   is   interesting   that   influence  can  be   indirect,   that   is,  a  
particle   α   may   not   be   able   to   influence   particle   γ   since   particle   β   is   “in   the  
middle”,  but  by  influencing  β,  α  will  have  an  effect  on  γ.  That  is  what  we  call  
compositionality,   in   linguistics.   We   have   to   pay   attention   to   the   whole  
derivation   (in  phase-­‐‑level   terms)   to  understand,   for   example,   the   interpretation  
that  a  certain  DP  receives  (see,  for  examples  and  analysis,  Krivochen,  2010a):  in  
that  case,  we  have  to  take  into  account  three  procedural  heads,  T,  Asp  and  Mod.  
Asp  can  influence  a  {D}  structure  in  {cause},  but  in  conjunction  with  T,  not  on  its  
own,  since  T  is  an  intervenient  head  as  they  are  part  of  the  same  informational  
domain.   There   is   no   blocking   (because   there   is   no   probing),   but   “cumulative  
influence”.  However,  it  seems  that  this  “cumulative  influence”  is  closely  related  
to  the  possibility  for  the  relevant  nodes  to  be  fused  (in  DM  terms),  and  thus  form  
a   single   morpheme   prior   to   Vocabulary   Insertion   or,   in   terms   more   close   to  
Grohmann’s,  to  whether  the  nodes  form  part  of  the  same  domain.  That  is,  after  
the  configuration  {Mod,  {Asp,  {Time,  {cause}}}}  is  complete,  compositionality  does  
its  work  and   the  dimensions   in  each   functional  head  combined  determine   the  
(most  accessible)  interpretation  for  the  [Definiteness]  dimension  in  D,  then,  in  a  
language   like   Spanish,   they   can   fuse   morphologically   and   a   single   item   is  
inserted  in  the  terminal  node.  These  dimensions,  we  have  argued  in  Krivochen  
(2010a),   are   “valued”   in   a   pre-­‐‑syntactic   instance,   namely,   C-­‐‑I   as   their  
“collapsing”  must  be  prior  to  that  of  the  dimensions  in  D  (since  it  is  a  sine  qua  
non   condition   for   {D}   interpretation).   By   hypothesis,   if   Functional   Categories  
(FFCC)  are  Procedural  Categories   (PPCC)   (as  Leonetti  &  Escandell  posit),  and  
these  encode  instructions  for  the  manipulation  of  conceptual  information,  these  
instructions  depend  on  the  intention  of  the  speaker,  a  very  basic  and  primitive  
representation  whose  nature,  as  I  have  already  said,  is  yet  unknown.  However,  
even  though  P,  and  v  are  procedural  heads,  there  is  no  cumulative  influence  but  
blocking   since   there   is   no   possibility   of   fusion.   Why   is   that?   Because   the   {P}  
structure   conveys   a   type   of   information,   namely   spatial,   and   that   is   totally  
different   from   and   independent   of   cause,   as   they   can   appear   separately   (e.g.,  
unaccusative   structures   have   P   but   not   cause,   and   unergative   structures   have  
cause  but  not  P).  What  is  more,  the  value  of  the  dimension  in  P  depends  on  the  
configuration  the  arguments  (i.e.,  non-­‐‑relational  elements,  see  Mateu,  2000a,  b)  
adopt  in  that  structure,  by  which  we  mean  that   it   is   totally  compositional.  For  
example,   in   a   verb   like   [shelve]   (a   book),   a   central   coincidence   relation   would  
make   the  derivation   crash   at   the   explicature   level,   since   a  book   cannot  have   a  
shelf,  and  I  have  demonstrated  (Krivochen,  2010d)  that  the  full  P  domain  can  be  
clausal,   as   the   primitive   [WITH]   is   equivalent   to   the   verb   [HAVE]   (equally  
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primitive).  In  the  case  of  Time,  Asp  and  Mod,  there  is  no  way  they  can  appear  
separately   or   “scrambled”,   as   scope   determines   interpretation:   we   cannot  
present  an  event  as  perfective  or   imperfective  if  we  have  not  situated  it   in  the  
time  axis  first,  and  by  doing  so,  given  it  reference.  What  is  true  is  that  {Mod}  may  
not  appear  in  certain  structures,  like  ECM,  to  allow  influence  from  a  functional  
head  in  the  higher  clause21.  
The   type   of   information   that   each   domain   carries   in   the   form   of  
dimensions  is  what  makes  the  quantum  dimensions  in  the  arguments  collapse,  
let  us  analyze  this  in  a  tree  diagram  (including  labels  only  for  clarity  purposes):  
(26)   
  
Notice  that  the  procedural  /  functional  heads  P,  {cause}  and  the  Split  TP  
signal  quantum  feature  collapse  areas,  in  consonance  with  Minimality.  Optimally,  
all   quantum   dimensions   on   a   certain   element   should   collapse   within   the  
minimal   collapse   area   (or   informational  domain,   as  we  have   said  above).  The  
three   Case   spheres,   as   I   have   already   said   in   Krivochen   (2010c),   are   in  
correlation  with   the   Thematic   spheres,   following  DeLancey’s   (2001)   proposal.  
Projections  are  completely  irrelevant,  but  I  have  included  labels  for  the  sake  of  
clarity.   Each   circle   determines   the   boundaries   of   a   domain   of   information   in  
terms   of   LF,   the   locus   of   collapsing.   Collapsing   cannot   take   place   across  
boundaries  for  two  reasons:  first,  because  of  the  Earliness  Principle:  operations  
take   place   as   soon   as   they   can,   and   there   is   no   reason   to   wait   for   another  
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functional   head   to   merge   when   we   already   have   a   head   that   can   make   the  
quantum  dimension  collapse.  Second,  because  of  Minimality:  different  types  of  
informational   domains   are   like   different   perspectives   for   measurement,   they  
make   the   dimension   collapse   to   one   state   or   the   other.   The   difference   with  
physics  here  is  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  the  information  carried  by  the  
functional  head  and  the  state  it  licenses.  Notice  also  that  it  would  make  no  sense  
to   talk  about  “VP”  or  anything   like   that,   since  VP  presupposes  a   root  already  
categorized,  and   I  posit   that   category,   like  Case,   is  a  quantum  dimension  and  
that  it  collapses  in  a  local  relation  with  a  procedural  head,  as  we  will  see  below.  
The   collapsing   of   quantum   dimensions   can   be   taken   as   a   possible  
justification   for   certain   instances   of  movement:   a   quantum  dimension   in   its   ψ-­‐‑
state  is  not  legible  by  the  interface  levels,  as  we  have  said.  Let  us  suppose  that  
we  have  a  SO  [X]  with  two  quantum  dimensions,  [PX]  and  [QX].  We  have  said  
that   there   is   a   correlation   between   the   information   that   a   certain  head   carries  
and   the   dimensions   it   can   license,   not   because   of   a   syntactic   constraint,   but  
because  of  interface  conditions:  if  a  procedural  node  carries  spatial  information,  
and  makes  a  definiteness  dimension  collapse,   the   result  will  be  a   crash   in   the  
explicature   level,  since   that  node  -­‐‑P,   for   the  sake  of  clarity-­‐‑   is  related  with  the  
Dative  /  Locative  sphere  (Krivochen,  2010c),  but  not  with  definiteness  or  so.  A  
certain  object  must  have  all  of   its  quantum  dimensions  collapsed  by   the   time   it   is  
transferred,  or,  better  explained,  a  certain  object  will  be  transferred  if  and  only  if  it  
has   all   of   its   quantum   dimensions   collapsed,   so   if   in   the   merge   position   not   all  
dimensions   have   collapsed   because   of   the   characteristics   of   the   nearest   head,  
the   element  must   look   for   a   procedural   head   that   can   license   that   dimension  
prior  to  Transfer.   It   is  possible  that  Movement  (understood  as  “remerge”  of  the  
relevant  object   in   the  relevant  position,  not  as  actual  displacement,  as   in  GB)  of  
[X]   applies   as   a   last   resort   to   create   a   structural   configuration   where   its  
dimensions  can  collapse  while  respecting  Minimality,  when  the  derivation  has  
reached  a  point  in  which  there  is  an  intermediate  element  blocking  the  minimal  
configuration   required   for   licensing   /   collapsing   quantum   dimensions   in   the  
smallest  unit  leading  to  convergence.  This  “movement”  would  be  very  much  like  
Grohmann’s   (2003,   2004)   intra-­‐‑clausal   movement,   it   goes   upwards   to   the  
immediately  “dominant”  informational  domain.  The  relevant  syntactic  object  would  
not   need   to   stop   in   each   available   position,   but   only   on   those   that,   once   the  
relevant  head  is  merged,  can  collapse  the  quantum  dimension,  as  the  derivation  
proceeds  in  real  time  and  no  object  can  “see”  what  will  be  merged  later  on.  This  
is  why  we  have   locality:  although  it  can  be  argued  that   it  would  be  simpler   to  
wait  until   the  whole  derivation   is   completed  and   just  move   the  element   to   its  
final  position,   that  would  imply  maintaining  a   larger  structure   in  the  working  
memory,  which  is  far  from  optimal.  Movement  applies  as  soon  as  it  can  (i.e.,  as  
soon   as   a   new   informational   domain   is   created   and   we   have   therefore   new  
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heads  that  can  enter  in  a  licensing  relation  with  the  object  in  question),  waiting  
would   imply   departing   from   the   best   option,   which   has   to   be   justified  
independently.   Anti-­‐‑locality   derives   from   the   fact   that   each   informational  
domain  has   the  procedural   features   to  make  a  certain  dimension  collapse,  but  
not   other,   so   intra-­‐‑domain   movement   would   be   trivial,   with   no   effect   in   the  
interface.  If  this  is  correct,  then  we  will  have  found  a  way  of  making  movement  
a  principled  operation,  since  there  is  no  stipulation  in  its  motivation  (as  there  is  
if   a   feature   like   EPP   is   posited),   only   the   dynamics   of   Merge   (internal   and  
external)   in   interaction   with   the   interface   requirements.   The   possibility   is  
currently   under   research,   since   it   is   possible   that   quantum   driven   movement  
applies  in  the  C-­‐‑I1-­‐‑syntax  interface  to  reorganize  elements  of  the  RSS  if  needed  
to  create  appropriate  configurations  for  collapse.  
2.1  Necessary  Dimensions?  
It   is   important  to  the  analysis  of  Transfer   to  try  to  determine  exactly  the  
number   and   nature   of   the   dimensions   we   are   dealing   with,   since   “full  
interpretability”  means   that  all  quantum  dimensions  have  collapsed   in  a   local  
relation   with   a   functional   node.   We   cannot   do   away   with   [Case],   since   it   is  
important  to  C-­‐‑I  in  the  construction  of  the  explicature  and  the  interpretation  of  
semantic   functions   (i.e.,   so-­‐‑called   “theta   roles”,   see   Krivochen,   2010c).   Case  
arises  from  a  structural  configuration  which  is  built  respecting  the  Conservation  
Principle,  therefore,  it  may  be  a  key  clue  for  LF  to  interpret  the  relation  between  
two  nodes,  a  conceptual  and  a  procedural  one.  Case  alone  means  nothing,  but  it  
is  a  clue  for  parsing,  and  this  justifies  its  permanence  in  my  system,  for  the  time  
being.  
The   same   happens,   apparently,   with   dimensions   like   [definiteness]   (or  
the   procedural   dimension   one   assigns  D):   a   definite  DP   is   fully   interpretable  
by  Relevance  Theory'ʹs  inferential  component  (i.e.,  C-­‐‑I)  and  can  undergo  referent  
assignment  (and  is  therefore  a  phase,  transferred  as  soon  as  it  can),  an  indefinite  
DP  cannot   in   the  usual   cases,   and   it  must  wait  until  TP,  AspP  and  ModP  are  
merged   and   all   the   relevant   dimensions   have   been   licensed   in   the  phase   level.  
Therefore,   this   dimension   seems   relevant   to   determine   transfer   point,   and  
cannot   be   dispensed  with,   along  with   T,   Asp   and  Mod,   of   course.   T   gives   a  
(caused  or  uncaused)  generic  event  reference,  Asp  expresses  the  decision  of  the  
speaker   as   regards   presenting   the   already   delimited   event   as   perfective   or  
imperfective.  Mod,   in   turn,   represents   the  attitude  of   the   speaker   towards   the  
proposition,   in  basic   terms  of   realis   /   irrealis.   In  Bally’s   terms,   the  dictum   (i.e.,  
the  proposition)  would   include  AspP  and   its  domain,   to  which  a  “truth  value”  
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can  be  assigned,  and  ModP  would  be  the  equivalent  to  the  modus,  which  is  out  
of  the  scope  of  truth  evaluation  in  logical  terms22.    
Now,   the  presence  of   the  primitive  dimensions  [CAUSE],   [EVENT]  and  
[LOCATION]  in  the  syntax  must  be  justified,  which  seem  to  have  been  carried  
from   earlier   stages,   if   we   follow   the   architecture   we   have   proposed   in  
Krivochen   (2010b,   d).   In   order   to   do   this,   I  will   reformulate   the   conservation  
principle,   now   that   I   have   dispensed  with   features   as   they  were   traditionally  
conceived  and  any  attempt  of  “valuation”  process:  
(27)   Conservation  Principle  (revised  formulation):  
Dimensions  cannot  be  eliminated,  but  they  must  be  instantiated  in  such  a  way  that  
they  can  be  read  by  the  relevant  level  so  that  the  information  they  convey  is  preserved.  
2.2  Categories  and  categorizers  
The  aforementioned  dimensions  are  the  skeleton  of  the  RSS,  built  in  the  
pre-­‐‑syntactic  instance  of  C-­‐‑I.  These  dimensions  relate  conceptual  elements,  and  
the  whole  RSS  is  not  linguistic,  as  we  hope  to  have  demonstrated  in  Krivochen  
(2010d),  but  meaningful.  RSSs  are  used  to  structure  thought,  and  there  is  access  
to  C-­‐‑I  without  any  participation  of  FL.  For  example,  when  we  see  a  certain  event  
taking  place  in  the  phenomenological  world,  we  organize  the  participants  and  
the   relations   in   terms   of   a   RSS   which   can   be   unaccusative,   unergative   or  
(di)transitive   (see  Mateu,   2000a,  b),   there   is  direct   transference   from   the  visual  
faculty  to  C-­‐‑I.  The  dimensions,  then,  are  not  linguistic,  and  therefore  cannot  be  
read   directly   by   FL   but   after   an   interface   level,   in   which   the   instantiation   of  
generic  concepts  into  roots  takes  place.  We  have  taken  that  interface  to  be  DM’s  
A   List,   which   contains   roots   and   quantum   dimensions.   Roots   are   severely  
semantically   underspecified   and   pre-­‐‑categorial,   so   they   must   be   “assigned   a  
category”   (this   terminology   will   be   reviewed   below)   to   generate   an   LF  
legitimate   representation 23 .   In   Krivochen   (2010b,   d)   we   have   posited   the  
existence  of  a  categorizer  c  comprising  three  dimensions,   [Cause],   [Event]  and  
[Entity]  (following  a  tendency  that  started  in  Marantz,  1997  and  can  be  tracked  
                                                                                                 
22  In   RT,   the   LF   that   the   syntax   generates   as   output   is   incapable   of   being  
assigned   a   truth   value,   since   it   is   an   incomplete   propositional   form   (with   referential  
expressions,  vague  elements,  etc.).  A  fully-­‐‑fledged  explicature,  on  the  contrary,  can  be  
truth-­‐‑evaluated.  That  is  the  concept  we  are  appealing  to  here,  without  commitment  to  
one  or  other  theory  of  truth.  
23  This  is  consistent  with  DM’s  “Categorization  Assumption”,  which  bans  “bare”  
(i.e.,  uncategorized)  roots  in  the  derivation,  but,  as  the  reader  will  see,  it  is  not  the  same,  
and  the  theoretical  implications  we  draw  are  quite  different.  We  are  not  invoking  any  
principle   or   filter   (which   would   be   stipulative),   only   bare   output   conditions   in   the  
semantic  component.  
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up   to  Panagiotidis,   2010   and   even  more   recent  works).  That   categorizer,   once  
merged   with   the   relevant   root,   determined   the   category   depending   on   the  
combination  of  the  values  of  the  dimensions.  For  example,  an  unergative  verb  
was  (l-­‐‑syntactically)  composed  by  a  root  merged  with  a  c  [+  Cause]  [+  Event]  [-­‐‑  
Entity]24.  However,  I  can  simplify  this  scenario  with  the  framework  outlined  in  
this   paper.   I   will   take   all   roots   to   carry   these   dimensions   as   quantum  
dimensions.  Roots,  as  such,  in  isolation,  would  still  be  semantically  underspecified  
and  thus  “uninterpretable”  (in  the  sense  that  they  would  make  no  contribution  
to   the   explicature)   in   C-­‐‑I   (Panagiotidis,   2009,   2010),   but   as   linguistic   entities  
they  must  have  the  inner  potentiality  of  collapsing  to  a  certain  category,  if  not,  
there   would   be   nothing   to   justify   the   distinction   between   roots   and   generic  
concepts  (or  conceptual  addresses  and  concepts,  in  Boeckx’s  terms).  Remember  that  
all  we  have  to  care  about  is  verbs  and  nouns,  since  Ps  are  functional  (that  is,  not  
associated  with  a  lexical  root,  following  the  lines  outlined  in  Krivochen  2010a)  
and   Adj.   and   Adv.   are   both   result   of   a   conflation   process   (Mateu,   2000a,   b),  
differing   only   in   the   type   of   elements   they   modify.   How   do   we  make   these  
dimensions   collapse?   The   answer   is   already   predictable:   by   merging   a  
functional  head.  Suppose  we  have  a  root  with  the  quantum  dimensions  in  the  
ψ-­‐‑state.  As  such,  it  cannot  be  manipulated  by  FL,  because  it  amounts  to  saying  
that   it   has   no   category,   for   practical   purposes.  We   introduce   that   root   in   the  
working   area   and   the   functional   category   it  merges  with  makes   the   quantum  
dimension  collapse   to  one  of   the  possible  states,  namely,  noun,  derived  nominal  
(from  caused  and  uncaused  verbs),  caused  verb,  uncaused  verb.  We  have,  then,  a  
categorizer-­‐‑less   architecture,   which   is   clearly   simpler   than   a   system   that  
requires  them,  and  we  do  not  have  to  make  big  changes  to  the  model  outlined  
in  previous  papers,   all  we  have   to  do   is  put   the  dimensions   that   c   comprised  
within  the  root  itself.  However,  the  reader  may  remember  that  in  earlier  works  
we   have   strongly   argued   against   categorizer-­‐‑less   systems,  with   the   following  
argument:   there   is   no  way   of   avoiding   the   generation   of   bundles   of   features  
(morphemes  in  classic  DM)  that  will  collapse  in  the  interfaces,  terminal  nodes  to  
which   no   vocabulary   item   could   correspond,   taking   as   valid   that   Merge   is  
unbounded  and  freely  applied.  That  is,  there  is  no  (principled)  way  of  avoiding  
overgeneration,   which   in   turn   results   in   a   computational   overload   in   the  
                                                                                                 
24  Unergative   verbs   and   transitive   verbs   share   the   categorizer   values,   but   we  
have   to   take   into   account   that   unergative   verbs   are   really   transitive  with   a   conflated  
nominal   element   and   that   superficial   monotransitivity   is   really   ditransitivity   with   a  
conflated   argument   (as   in   [shelve]   or   [saddle]).   These   transitive   verbs   are   formed  by  
adding  a  [Cause]  relation  to  an  unaccusative  structure  (thus  yielding  a  [vP  [VP  [PP]]]  
structure),   so   that   there  would   really   be   only   two   fundamental  RSSs   (and,   therefore,  
two  ways  of  conceptualizing  the  world):  the  unergative  (caused,  without  spatial  relation)  
and  the  unaccusative  (uncaused,  with  spatial  relation).  
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interface  levels  as  the  number  of  possibilities  of  combination  is  enormous  even  
with  a  relatively  small  “lexical  array”.  Even  though  I  stick  to  that  objection  in  a  
standard   system   (i.e.,   orthodox   minimalism),   my   use   of   the   Conservation  
Principle   helps   us   have   a   non-­‐‑stipulative   way   of   restricting   Merge   and   thus  
invalidate  the  objection.  If  the  information  has  to  be  preserved  all-­‐‑the-­‐‑way-­‐‑down  
the   derivational   path   (from   the   pre-­‐‑syntactic   instance   of   C-­‐‑I   to   the   external  
systems   that   receive   the   syntactic   derivation   as   input)   because   of   the  
Conservation  Principle,  then  only  that  merger  of  a  root  with  a  functional  category  
that   results   in   the   maintenance   of   information   will   be   allowed   by   principle.  
Thus,   if   we   start   with   a   pragmatic   global   plan   (in   Bernárdez’s   terms)   that  
“shapes”  a  RSS  like  the  following  (using  Mateu’s  “labels”):  
(28)   
  
We  would  be   conceptually  generating   a   location  V,  namely,   [shelve].   In  
order   to  preserve   the   information,  we  have   to  merge   the   root   that   instantiates  
the  complex  generic  concept  √SHEL-­‐‑  with  an  [eventive]  node,  a  [cause]  primitive  
and   then   Time,   Asp   and   Mod   to   have   a   fully-­‐‑fledged   proposition   including  
dictum   and  modus.   In   that   merger,   the   structural   configuration   for   “category  
identification”25  in   LF   is   created,   and   the   derivation   converges.   To   make   a  
generalization,  a  “verb”  would  arise  from  the  following  configuration:  
(29) [Time…α…√]  
                                                                                                 
25  I  use   the  term  “category   identification”  as  parallel   to  “label   identification”,  as  
both   are   only   relevant   in   the   explicature   level.   In   the   syntax,   therefore,   there   is   no  
“category   creation”   in   the   sense   that   an   a-­‐‑categorial   element   is   somehow   given   a  
category  (for  example,  by  merging  it  with  a  FC  or  a  categorizer),  as  much  as  there  is  no  
“label   creation”,   as   argumented   by  Gallego   (2010).   The   idea   is   that   the   “category”   is  
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26 We use the term ³FDWHJRU\identification´DVSDUDOOHOWR³ODEHOLGHQWLILFDWLRQ´DVERWK are only relevant in 
WKHH[SOLFDWXUHOHYHO,QWKHV\QWD[WKHUHIRUHWKHUHLVQR³FDWHJRU\FUHDWLRQ´LQWKHVHQVHWKDWDQD-categorial 
element is somehow given a category (for example, by merging it with a FC or a categorizer), as much as 
WKHUHLVQR³ODEHOFUHDWLRQ´DVDUJXPHQWHGE\*DOOHJR 7KHLGHDLVWKDWWKH³FDWHJRU\´LVLQWHUSUHWHG
from a configurational relation. 
 T 
  r 
  r 
   [GO] 
[the book] 
[shelf]      [TO] 
 R 
 R 
   [CAUSE] 
 [Initiator] 
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Being   [α]   an   X   number   of   non-­‐‑intervenient   nodes   for   categorization  
purposes,   like   {cause}   or   {event},   which   can   appear   in   nominal   structures   as  
well  (for  example,  in  derived  nominals).  Categorization,  then,  would  depend  on  
a  local  relation  with  a  procedural  head  whose  distribution  is  specified  enough  
to  determine  an  unambiguous  interpretation  from  the  structure  that  reaches  the  
interface   level.  My  claim   is   that  T   is   to  V  what  D   is   to  N,   any   root  under   the  
domain  of  D  (in  a  minimal  configuration)  will  be  interpreted  as  a  N.  
2.3  Radical  Theory  
(30) Roots  do  not  have  dimensions  whatsoever.  Configuration  is  enough  for  C-­‐‑I2  to  
determine  the  “perspective”  to  be  taken  over  the  semantic  substance.  
Local   relation   [X…√]   is   enough   to   create   “categorial   interpretations”   of  
roots,  therefore,  there  is  no  need  to  posit  quantum  categorial  dimensions.  This  
depends  on  the  relation  procedural  category  –  perspective  on  the  root  being  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑
one,  as  it  seems.  The  same  happens  with  Case  (and,  incidentally,  theta-­‐‑roles):  
NOMINATIVE:   read   off   from   a   {Time,   {D}}   local   relation,   and   interpreted  
thematically   (in   the   explicature   building   process,   see   Sperber   &   Wilson,  
2003)  as  Agent  /  Force    
ACCUSATIVE:   read   off   from   a   {Cause,   {D}}   local   relation,   and   interpreted  
thematically  as  Theme,  the  object  (Figure)  located  in  /  moving  towards,  etc.  
a  Ground    
DATIVE:  read  off  from  a  {P,   {D}}   local  relation,  and   interpreted  thematically  as  
Location,  the  Ground  in  Talmy’s  terms.  
This   is   currently  under   investigation,  but  could   lead   to  a  much  simpler  
categorization  system  than  current  proposals  (XSM,  DM).  
I  may  be  accused  in  this  point  of  abandoning  restrictivism  and  arguing  in  
favor   of   a   constructivist   theory   that   only   generates   convergent   derivations   (a  
“bad”   version   of   crash-­‐‑proof26).   However,   this   is   not   so,   because   I   am   not  
proposing   any   specific   syntactic   filter   or   principle   that   restricts  Merge   in   the  
working  area  (like  s-­‐‑/c-­‐‑selection  or  subcategorization  frames,  for  example),  but  
invoking   a   much   more   basic   principle   of   physical   systems   that   assures   the  
conservation  of  information  throughout  the  derivation.  Syntax  remains  the  free  
unbounded  mechanism  of   recursive   combinatory   that   it   has   always  been,   but  
we  all  have  to  bear  in  mind  that,  as  part  of  the  natural  world,  it  is  subjected  to  the  
same   constraints   and   principles   as   any   other   physical   system   and   it   is   not   totally  
independent  but  restricted  by  interface  conditions.  
  
                                                                                                 
26  Michael  Putnam,  p.c.  
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3.  Conclusion:  a  brief  summary  of  Radical  Minimalism  
In   this   section   I   would   like   to   list   some   basic   tenets   of   Radical  
Minimalism  (some  of  which  are  shared  with  the  traditional  Chomskyan  view),  
to  give  it  a  more  formal  presentation  and  start  outlining  the  model  that  we  will,  
hopefully,   expand   in   future   papers.   Our   basic   assumptions,   and   some  
conclusions  we  have  drawn  from  them  are:  
1) Language  is  part  of  the  “natural  world”;  therefore,  it  is  fundamentally  a  
physical  system.  
2) As  a  consequence  of  1,  it  shares  the  basic  properties  of  physical  systems  
and  the  same  principles  can  be  applied  (uncertainty,  SE,  the  Conservation  
Principle,   locality,   etc.),   the   only   difference   being   the   properties   of   the  
elements  that  are  manipulated  in  the  relevant  system.    
3) The  operations  are  taken  to  be  very  basic,  simple  and  universal,  as  well  
as   the   constraints   upon   them,  which   are  determined  by   the   interaction  
with  other  systems,  not  by  stipulative  intra-­‐‑theoretical  filters.  
4) 2  and  3  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  
(30)  Strong  Radically  Minimalist  thesis  (SRMT):  
All  differences  between  physical  systems  are  “superficial”  and  rely  only  on  the  
characteristics   of   their   basic   units   [i.e.,   the   elements   that   are   manipulated],   which  
require  minimal  adjustments   in  the  formulation  of  operations  and  constraints  [that   is,  
only  notational   issues].  At  a  principled  level,   all  physical   systems  are   identical,  make  
use  of  the  same  operations  and  respond  to  the  same  principles.  
5) From   SRMT,   we   can   follow   the   regularities   that   have   been   found  
regarding   the   structure   of   each   faculty   in   the   context   of   a   massively  
modular  mind  (Katz  &  Pesetsky’s,  2011  “Identity  Thesis”  as  an  example),  
as  well  as  the  parallels  existing  between  subpersonal  systems  (i.e.,  mental  
faculties)   and   other   biological   /   physical   systems   (see  Uriagereka,   1998  
for  some  examples  and  references).    
Let  us   take  as   the   last   example  EST  phrase   structure   rules,  which  were  
rewriting  rules.  They  were  abandoned  because  of  two  reasons,  only  one  of  which  
was  clear  at   that   time:   there  were  redundancies  between   the   information   they  
conveyed   and   the   information   present   in   the   lexicon   and   because   rewriting  
rules   could   tell   us   nothing   specific   about   language,   since   the   patterns   they  
generate  can  be  found  in  many  domains  of  the  natural  world  (Uriagereka,  1998).  
We  can  generate  VPs  as  well  as  Fibonacci  sequences,  or  describe  fractal  patterns.  
That  was  seen  as  a  reason  to  abandon  PSR,  but  I  see  it  as  a  supporting  argument  
for   our   hypothesis:   regularities   indicate   that   we   are   dealing   with   physical  
systems   (as  defined  above)   that   are   all  part   of   the   same  physical  universe   (or  
“natural  world”,   as   is  more   common   to   say   in  Generative  Grammar),  which,  
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optimally,  should  be  regulated  by  a  small  set  of  general  principles  and  allow  a  
small  set  of  universal  operations  (like  Merge)  to  be  performed.  
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